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THE MACHTPOLITIK DOCTRINE FROM ANTIQUITY TO PRESENT
Brian Abendshein, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1999
The thesis is an archival study of international relations. This thesis will
analyze the Machtpolitik, or power politics, doctrine from its beginnings in
Plato's Republic to the present day. In considering this evolution the thesis will
seek to address the following three main questions. First, does traditional
machtpolitik doctrine still exist today? Second, has the rise of democratic sys
tems of government limited the effectiveness of diplomacy? Third, what are
the causes of international instability? The debate over these questions in mod
ern times is framed by three main factions: Idealists, Descriptive Realists, and
Normative Realists. Each of these positions will be discussed in the thesis and
the conclusion will present Friedrich Nietzsche as an unique exemplar of the
idealist school.
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CHAPTER I
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF MACHTPOLITIK
The twentieth century has seen the rise of the nation-state to near total
dominance of the international order. While the tail end of the century has
also seen the emergence of non-state actors, such as multinational corpora
tions and non-governmental organizations with various objectives, it is still
the nation-states that are the preeminent actors on the international level.
Indeed, with events such as the breakup of the former Soviet Union, there are
currently more states than ever before.
As long as there have been states, there has been a need for them to
communicate with one another. The reasons for this are obvious; the demar
cation of borders, forging alliances, settling disputes, and the ending of wars
or their prevention are just a few of the reasons. These communications have
become known as international relations. The study of international relations
began almost simultaneously with the beginning of international relations
themselves. The Greeks were among the earliest to record the process and
results of states dealing with one another, both in war and peace. The best
example of this is Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War. In his
classic work Thucydides details the events of the war between Athens and
Sparta, and while doing so he also analyzes the nature, sources and percep
tions of power in the struggle.
Power is one of the main factors that affects how states deal with one
another. Many aspects of a state contribute to its overall power; among them
1
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are the military, economy, technological resources and size of population. In
most cases the power that is the result of these factors is used for one pur
pose, to influence others. The following is a typical definition of power poli
tics. "In its most general sense, power, politically speaking, is the capacity to
bend another to our will." 1 Hans Morganthau sta_tes his definition of power
this way: "When we speak of power, we mean a man's control over the
minds and actions of other men."2 As we can see, both definitions could be
applied to the affairs of states or to the affairs of individuals who are dealing
with one another.
Power has been one of the most analyzed aspects of political and social
life. The ability to control others has long been a temptation and a drive for
humanity. Power can be used either for good reasons or it can be perverted
and used for selfish reasons. This has been the dilemma of power and the
reason that it is one of the most studied phenomena of politics, international
relations, and interpersonal relations.
Plato and the Greeks sought to define what power was and how it
could be used to build the best society for this world. Machiavelli's writings
pertain to the use of power by a ruler to stabilize the state, retain his domain,
and if he were of mind to, expand his power. Much of it also pertains to
heads of state and the keeping of their power despite those who would chal
lenge them. There is, however, a side of Machiavelli that is concerned with
the moral life of men and seeks to educate men of the proper way in which to
live. Hobbes, in his writings, described how power should be placed in a
single sovereign if pandemonium is to be avoided and how the sovereign
should then use this power in ruling his subjects. Although the scope has
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changed over the centuries, the goals remain the same.
In the twentieth century, the debate over power politics and how
power should be used has largely been characterized by the dichotomy be
tween the idealists and the realists. The idealist position is a largely homoge
neous one. Its members seek to describe a perfect international order or an
individual state utopia. Woodrow Wilson's attempts to form the League of
Nations is an example of the idealist school of thought. The idealists also
view man ss inherently good, and it is from this position that they can postu
late their ideal international order. In the conclusion, I shall present the phi
losophy of Friedrich Nietzsche as representative of idealist thought and as a
possible, although highly unlikely, solution for the problems that are the
subject of this thesis.
The realist side must, I argue here, be broken down even further into
the schools of descriptive realism and normative realism. On the surface, this
appears to be another dichotomous relationship, but this is not really the case.
Descriptive realism seeks to describe the situation and use of power as it
actually is without passing judgement as to whether it is right or wrong.
Thucydides is the prime example of a descriptive realist.
The normative realist position cannot be as neatly characterized as the
descriptive realist. Power politics, for much of its history, could be character
ized by the machtpolitik position as exemplified by the Machiavelli of The
Prince and Thrasymachus. Both Machiavelli and Thrasymachus proposed
that whatever the stronger party was able to enforce upon the weaker, was
the just course of action. They saw the world in terms of might making right,
and there was no escaping this certainty. One of the last true proponents of
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this position was Carl Schmitt. His philosophy, which will be discussed in
Chapter II, was the last of the true machtpolitik doctrines. Machtpolitik has
grown diffuse and diluted as this century has matured and as will be shown
in the rest of the paper, the normative realists, too, have varying opinions and
beliefs about what is important in looking at power politics and how things
are viewed in light of power politics. It is also important to insist at this
point, that not all members of the realist school are practitioners of
machtpolitik. Normative realism is a much more complex world-view than
what it appears to be from the outside, and the general tendency to lump all
who postulate the primacy of power into a single position is incorrect.
There are several issues that must be addressed in looking at power
politics in the late twentieth century. The first of these is whether
machtpolitik still exists at this point in the twentieth century in its traditional
strong descriptive sense, or has it been substantially transformed? I argue
that while there are still strong remnants of the machtpolitik position, they
have been radically transformed by the events of this century. Thrasymachus,
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Schmitt would no longer recognize the position that
they once championed. Thrasymachus and Schmitt will be addressed in
Chapter II, and Machiavelli and Hobbes in Chapter III.
The second issue is the struggle between diplomacy and democracy.
While democratic societies have come to be the norm in our time, are they
conducive to the proper conduct of international relations or do they make it
harder to negotiate? Prior to and for the first part of this century, diplomacy
was handled among elites following a set course of protocols. The advent of
democratic societies now limits the powers of these elites to negotiate and has
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introduced an element of uncertainty to international relations. Clearly,
democracy has changed the way in which international relations are con
ducted. The question now is whether these changes are for good or ill.
Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Hans Morganthau feel that these
changes are not for the best when considering the stability of the international
order. I believe the evidence supports them, and these positions will be
addressed in Chapters IV and V.
The third issue to be addressed is what are the causes of international
instability. Is it the state system itself? Or is it the spread of ideology and
nationalism? Or could it even be human nature itself? I suggest that none of
these are solely responsible for the conflict in the world. Ideology and nation
alism are the leading candidates with their ability to incite zealotry. Human
nature is a close second due to, as Hobbes felt, man's willingness to harm his
fellow man. Last of the three would be the state system as it currently exists,
and this is only because of it providing the fertile ground and a means to act
out ideology and nationalism. These topics will be addressed in Chapter V
also.
How does one explain the state of affairs that exists among nations?
Hobbes, for one, refers to a State of Nature. In this condition all states are
identical in behavior and the overriding concern is self-preservation and
mutual hostility. Hobbes sought to apply this paradigm for behavior to
individuals and states, the latter being the more probable application. The
drive for self-preservation is embodied in the concept of the national interest
when it is applied to the state. When states invoke the national interest, they
are saying that the issue involved is of such importance that only those who
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are most qualified to address it should do so. If the issue were mishandled,
the very life of the state might be imperiled.
Given the state of relations in the world during the course of the twen
tieth century, one sees that morality as commonly understood has seldom
been a major concern in the conduct of affairs of state. The Cold War between
the United States and the Soviet Union tends to confirm conclusions drawn
from the historical record. Why this is the case is the question that is persis
tently addressed. In the following chapters, the role that morality plays in
international relations will be examined. First, to understand its apparent
lacking in most forms of international relations, and second, to understand
why this is the case. Finally, to examine the possibility for increasing the
application of morality to issues of international relations.

1 Kaplan, p. 445
2 Morganthau, p. 28

CHAPTER II
THE GREEKS AND CARL SCHMITT
The study of most sciences began with the Greeks, and the area that has
become known as political science and its subsections, like power politics, is no
exception. When considering the Greek views of power and international rela
tions, two of the main sources of study are Plato's The Republic and Thucydides'
The History of the Peloponnesian War. While both works address the issue of
power it should be noted that the former is a much more theoretical work and
the latter is a chronicling of actual events. Plato was the pre-eminent philoso
pher of his time. He was a student of Socrates and later was the teacher of
Aristotle. While many of his ideas have been rejected over the course of time,
he provided the springboard from which to proceed. Thucydides has been called
the first historian, and his work set the standard for all future historical works.
Both of these men produced their works during the Peloponnesian War,
and both participated in the war. Given this crucial event in both their lives, it
becomes apparent in their writing that mental and external stability are of great
importance to them. In a sense, both thinkers are searching for the ground
upon which stability can be built, whether it be in individual lives or in the life
of a state. It appears that to the Greek mind it is a combination of power and
virtue that leads to stability.
The first book of The Republic is devoted to the issue of virtue. In it
Plato, through the character of Socrates, is engaging in a discussion to deter
mine what justice is. It is in this discussion that one first encounters
7
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Thrasymachus and his view of what is just. The position that he takes may very
well be the first recorded example of power politics. Thrasymachus states, "What
I say is 'just' or 'right' means nothing but what is to the interest of the stronger
party."1 The even simpler restatement of what Thrasymachus has said is that
might makes right. This doctrine expresses the way in which power tends to be
used. Those with the power dictate what is to be done to those who do not have
power. Thrasymachus holds this to be true for any type of state: "That is what
I mean: in all states alike 'right' has the same meaning, namely what is for the
interest of the party established in power, and that is the strongest."2
Socrates does not believe that this can be all that there is to justice and
begins to challenge Thrasymachus' definition of justice. Socrates puts forward
what would now be considered a traditional version of what is just; that men
perform acts, not only self-interestedly, but also for the betterment of those that
they aid. Socrates uses the examples of a doctor treating a patient and a ship
captain commanding a crew. The benefit of their actions does not redound
solely to them, but also to the patient and the rest of the crew and passengers.
Thrasymachus feels that it is only by practicing injustice that one can hope to
gain wealth and further power. Thrasymachus states;
So true is it, Socrates, that injustice, on a grand enough scale, is superior
to justice in strength and freedom and autocratic power; and 'right', as I
said at first, means simply what serves the interest of the stronger party;
'wrong' means what is for the interest and profit of oneself.3
By the end of the first book Socrates has pointed out several flaws in the
doctrine, but has not been able to totally refute it. Thrasymachus makes very
little distinction between the sphere of the individual and the sphere of the state
in regards to the benefits of practicing injustice. If the individual or the state is
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stronger than those around it, its commands are right. Thrasymachus goes so
far as to imply that if one were to disobey the orders of a stronger party, then the
weaker one is in the wrong. Socrates' counter arguments make Thrasymachus'
position somewhat unstable, but he cannot deny that in some circumstances
'might' does indeed make 'right'.
Thucydides, it seems, would also take issue with what Thrasymachus
has said. Thucydides states, "Men seem to resent injustice more than violence;
the former is regarded as unfair advantage taken by an equal, the later is
compulsion applied by a superior."4 One might consider this statement as an
attitude that would be widely held by citizens in a democracy like that of
Athens, where all citizens were considered equal. Given the definition of power
presented above, it would seem that the doctrine that Thrasymachus proposes would
fall into the category that Thucydides labels as violence. Yet, both Plato and
Thucydides regard the 'might makes right' position as injustice. This question of
which of the two, injustice or violence, power politics as presented by Thrasymachus,
may account for Socrates' inability to totally refute the doctrine. Also, it may repre
sent the first distinction between the idealist and realist schools of thought.
The philosophy that Thrasymachus proposes is the foundation of the
machtpolitik philosophy in that it attempts to propose that all relationships are
power political relationships. Indeed, this has been a prominent position since
the time of the Greeks and has continued to have proponents well into the twen
tieth century. The problem with the position that Thrasymachus takes is that it
attempts to stretch too far. If he had stopped with just explaining all relation
ships as power political relationships, Socrates would have had an even more
difficult time trying to refute the argument. However, Thrasymachus reaches
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for something more. He seeks to say that those who possess power are infal
lible when commanding or making laws, merely because they have the power
to do so. This is where the argument runs into trouble. Socrates shows us that
just because one has power does not mean that one always uses power in the
best way for oneself or others; and also shows that there are other reasons to
wield power other than self-interest. Further, Socrates makes a persuasive case
that in order to maintain this position, the dominant interests must compromise
their own exclusive interests, fearing a reaction to extreme exertions of self-interest.
Socrates, in the later books of The Republic, establishes what he feels the
virtues that men and states should have. He does this in the description of his
ideal state. He also states what he feels justice truly is - all aspects of a state or man
functioning in their prescribed way, doing what they are best suited for. For Socrates,
when this is the case, a man cannot help but act in a just or right manner.
After the virtues and justice have been established, the other key to sta
bility is power. Historian June Allison states; "Thucydides is concerned in the
Archaeology with fundamental bases of power which can be applied univer
sally. He found them to be money, ships, and governmental stability."5 Since
this statement makes it appear that we are trying to define stability by includ
ing stability in the definition, let us discuss the last aspect of the definition of
power that Thucydides gives according to Allison. The government of Athens
changed several times during the course of the war. It seems, however, that
Thucydides feels that these changes were not the result of the failure of indi
viduals in the government. He states; "The cause of all these evils was love of
power due to ambition and greed, which led to the rivalries from which party
spirit sprung."6 It was individuals acting in non-virtuous ways in a quest to
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secure power to themselves instead of the state's that caused the changes in the
government of Athens and not any failing of the governments themselves.
Without virtue, power itself cannot provide stability.
At the beginning of the war it was Athens that had all of these character
istics of power. The democracy had been functioning smoothly, her ports were
always busy, her navy dominant, and her colonies provided a steady source of
revenue. Due to these factors Athens had several victories early in the war.
Even with these advantages, however, Athens can still be seen to use
tactics that seem to come straight from Thrasymachus. Thucydides describes
the fate of Melos. Melos was a neutral colony of Lacedaemon, that became
openly hostile to Athens after some of Athens more aggressive actions. The
Athenian envoys order Melos to surrender because; "You know and we know,
as practical men, that the question of justice arises only between parties of equal
strength, and that the strong do as they can, and the weak submit."7 Melos did
not submit, and instead was defeated by Athens and all the men were executed.
After early victories by Athens, Sparta sought to end the conflict by ne
gotiations on several occasions. Athens decided to pursue the conflict instead
of negotiating. This resulted in the people of Athens being split on which course
of action to pursue, which meant that Athens was less and less able to make
critical decisions on how to conduct the war in a timely manner and opened the
door to factional strife. It also resulted in the dismissal of generals that, while
militarily successful, were undermined by ambitious citizens in Athens. It is
this ambition that ultimately lost the war for Athens.
We can see what the results of these actions were. Athens fell from promi
nence and Sparta became the leader in Greek affairs. Athens had power to
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spare at the beginning of the war. It was the lack of virtue that lead to her
downfall. Sparta, in contrast, used the virtue of its leaders to carefully manage
and cultivate its power until such time that they could defeat Athens. Overall,
Sparta was more stable than Athens. The Athenian citizens forgot discipline
and became overly ambitious. While they still had power, it was power with
out the direction provided by virtue, especially justice. Given the definition of
justice that Socrates gave, if they had acted according to it, they would have
acted the right way. The lack of virtue meant a lack of stability and as a result
the loss of the war.
Thucydides makes qualified use of the assumptions that are made by
Thrasymachus. He seeks both to put forward some ideas of what makes a state
powerful, by chronicling how these things came into play in the war between
Athens and Sparta, and to establish that Athens i.e., so all states, ruthlessly pur
sue their own interest in international relations, as witnessed by Athens' treat
ment of her confederated states. As stated above, Thucydides makes no state
ments of bias towards one side or the other, he just records the events as they
happen. With his work, Thucydides sets the standard for all future histories
that will be written. To describe the events as they take place and to do so
without bias for any side involved.
The power political tradition that started with Thrasymachus continued,
via Machiavelli and Hobbes, into the twentieth century. Carl Schmitt is the
philosopher that best represents the machtpolitik doctrine in this century. In
his principle work, The Concept of the Political, he puts forward a theory that
proclaims that the political relationships of the state are the preeminent rela
tionships, and ultimately the only ones of true importance. For him there are
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no other considerations in politics than power. However, Schmitt also was a
keen observer of the events occurring around him in Wiemar Germany. In this
aspect, one could also classify him with Thucydides as a descriptive realist.
Rune Slagstad's essay "Liberal Constitutionalism and its Critics: Carl
Schmitt and Max Weber", George Schwab's book The Challenge of the Excep
tion and John McCormick's article "Fear, Technology, and the State" provide
analyses of the foundations of Schmitt's thoughts on power politics; and how
power affects states both in international relationships and internally; as well as
providing commentary on Schmitt's ideas.
Slagstad states that, for Schmitt, liberalism is the enemy, with its veiling
of concrete political reality. "Political reality is not governed by 'abstract insti
tutions and systems of norms', but ruled by tangible people and organizations."8
Schmitt is seeking to present politics as it actually is, and must be. Schmitt feels
that liberalism masquerades behind the cover of its institutions and norms to
hide from the fact that power is what motivates politics. Much of his philoso
phy revolves around the idea of the "political" and the key decision that it makes;
that of distinguishing between friends and enemies. Schmitt states,
The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives
can be reduced is that between friend and enemy. This provides a defini
tion in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition or one
indicative of substantial content.9
It is apparent to Schmitt that as situations change friends may become
enemies and enemies may become friends. This is why he establishes the
political as a criterion and not a set definition. This can be linked to Hobbes
and the loose alliances that he describes in his State of Nature. In Hobbes, due
to the chaos of the State of Nature, no one can be sure that they can trust another.
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The "political" is in many respects very similar to the State of Nature as
envisioned by Hobbes. For most philosophers this conception has lost its ap
peal as a model for international relations, but not for Schmitt. Says Slagstad,
"Schmitt, however, seeks to reintroduce the state of nature as the prevailing
political position."10 In this type of environment a state or person must be
constantly vigilant of the events and people around him, and ready to respond
as is needed. Schwab says of Schmitt, "He observed that politics is a sphere
which is constantly dominated by the necessity of drawing distinctions between
friend and enemy (Freund und Fiend)."11 Indeed, it is this distinction between
friend and enemy that is the sole province of the "political". "Thereby the in
herently objective nature and autonomy of the political becomes evident by
virtue of its being able to treat, distinguish, and comprehend the friend-enemy
antithesis independently of other antitheses."12

The other antitheses that

Schmitt speaks of are the other arenas of public participation in the liberal state;
religion, economics, and art, etcetera.
It is the application of reason that allows Schmitt to make these distinc
tions between friend and enemy. The idea of the "political" and distinguishing
between friends and enemies are the cornerstones of Schmitt's philosophy.
McCormick states,
'The political' is irreducible to any other element. Indeed, Schmitt envi
sions the friend/ enemy distinction as so fundamental and elementary
that in the course of his argument he feels compelled at particular points
to remark on the self-evidence of his thesis: 'nothing can escape this
logical conclusion of the political'."13
Therefore, the "political" has become akin to the state of nature in which all are
enemies of one another. Into this breach must step the state to give order and
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protect its citizens.
In the Hobbesian state of nature man lives in a constant state of fear.
Schmitt seeks to use this fear to provide the basis for the forming of the state.
"In other words, fear is the source of political order. Human beings once con
fronted with the prospect of their own dangerousness will be terrified into the
arms of authority."14 This idea is a pure descendent of Hobbes' thought.
Schmitt, like Hobbes, believes that man is inherently inclined to evil. "For
Hobbes, truly a powerful and systematic political thinker, the pessimistic con
ception of man is the elementary presupposition of a specific system of political
thought."15 It is now the duty of the state to protect its citizens from one an
other and outside threats. However, the state and those in control of it must be
able and willing to make the distinctions between friend and enemy. This is
one of the areas in which Schmitt's criticisms of liberalism come into play. If
liberalism does indeed cover and distort concrete political realities, it stands to
reason that it will fail at some point to properly distinguish between friends
and enemies. This could have catastrophic consequences for the state.
To enable the state to correctly make these distinctions, it must remain
separate from and superior to the society which it governs. The means to this
end is reason. Schwab states; "Schmitt's understanding of objective reason is
its capacity to distinguish friend from enemy, and the state's ability not to suc
cumb to civil society as such but to serve the entire nation rather than just sec
tions of it."16 Thus, the ability to distinguish between friend and enemy is
used internally as well as externally to determine what is best for the entire
state and not just what might benefit a particular special interest. "The state
must stand above society as a quasi-objective entity, rather than help precipi-
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tate civil war by existing as one subjectivity among others."17
To summarize Schmitt's political thought; he believed that one should
not be disillusioned by any thing that would distract one from seeing politics
for what it is, the pursuit of power. The state and those leading it have a duty to
all parts of society to ensure that the state is safe from external threat, in light of
the "political" conception of international relations; and that it serve all mem
bers of the society equally. The functions of the state should not be hampered
by things such as partisan politics, ideologies or considerations of normative
morality.
Schmitt models some of his philosophy on Hobbes and Machiavelli's
conceptions of the reason of state argument. He makes considerations of power
just as Machiavelli would have and seeks to describe and explain these power
relationships in terms of the "political". The "political" stands as his reformu
lation of the state of nature and serves to provide the fear that he feels is neces
sary to establish civil society and its subordination to the state, and to keep that
society in place once it has been established. Schmitt fears the possibility of
civil war just as Hobbes did. Schmitt dislikes liberalism because he feels that it
prevents one from seeing and describing things as they actually are and this is
not something that the state can afford to have happen given what is at stake. It
is through the "political" that the state and its leaders can see things for what
they really are and act accordingly.
After Carl Schmitt, as will be demonstrated in Chapter

V,

there are no

clear inheritors of the machtpolitik position. The position has become very dif
fuse and cannot be clearly defined in the twentieth century. There are several,
like Kissinger and Brzezinski, who seem to exemplify parts of the position, but
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none are totally devoted to machtpolitik. As will be shown later, Kissinger is
closer to a true adherent of the position than is Brzezinski. Yet, Brzezinski is
crucial in the study of the field because he represents the transition from
machtpolitik to a wider perception of the issues that surround power politics
and international relations. Brzezinski is one of the first to raise the questions
regarding the role of ideology, nationalism, and human nature and how these
things lead to the difficulties that are ever present in international relations.

1 Cornford, p. 18
2 Cornford, p. 18
3 Cornford, p. 26
4 Thucydides, p. 63
5 Allison, p. 21
6 Thucydides, p. 190
7 Thucydides, p. 267
8 Slagstad, p. 112
9 Schmitt, p. 26
10 Slagstad, p. 115
11 Schwab, p. 51
12 Schmitt, p. 27
13 McCormick, p. 621
14 McCormick, p. 622
15 Schmitt, p. 65
16 Schwab, p. 57
17 McCormick, p. 625

CHAPTER III
MACHIAVELLI AND HOBBES
This chapter will present the philosophies -of Niccolo Machiavelli and
Thomas Hobbes. These two philosophers represent the middle development of
the power politic doctrine. A cursory reading of The Prince leads to the belief
that Machiavelli can be considered the father of the machtpolitik doctrine.
However, the Machiavelli of The Discourses presents a different aspect of the
philosophy. It is this other side of Machiavelli that should make one realize that
attributing the birth of modern machtpolitik to Machiavelli, is not quite accu
rate. As shall be discussed below, Machiavelli has another position that is con
cerned with the moral life of people, and ultimately, their individual felicity.
It is on the grounds of felicity that Machiavelli and Hobbes find com
monality. It can be argued that the main thrust of Hobbes' work was on the
issue of individual felicity. Hobbes was ultimately concerned with social order
and preventing the horrors of the State of Nature from occurring. It is the hor
ror of the war of all against all that lead him to the sovereign of Leviathan.
Hobbes was concerned with issues of power as they affected the founding and
running of the social order. This and his ideas on how power relates with mo
rality and the State of Nature will be discussed later in the chapter.
We turn first to the philosophy of Niccolo Machiavelli and shall also ex
amine his place as a kind of transition point between the sides of descriptive
realism and normative realism. For our purposes the main work of Machiavelli's
to be considered is The Prince, but as stated above The Discourses provide a
18
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critical counterpoint to The Prince. In The Prince Machiavelli details the use of
power in ruling a state as he believes one should. It is a work with a long
history of controversy. Some hold it to be a totally immoral document, while
others regard it as valuable and the first modern piece of machtpolitik.
The aspect of power politics that is most often linked with Machiavelli is
the doctrine of "reason of state". This doctrine endorses the use of any means
to attain the stability of the state. It is this doctrine that gives Machiavelli the
label of father of modern machtpolitik. It is upon further reading of Machiavelli
that one discovers that Machiavelli's conception of the reason of state only al
lows the prince to exercise it when the stability of the state is already at hand.
The doctrine also had the effect of blinding Machiavelli to some of the things
that have so come to affect states and international relations in this century;
nationalism, ideology, and religious zealotry. Machiavelli saw the beginnings
of nationalism in his observations of France, but could not envision the rabidity
that characterizes so much of nationalism today. Also, he would never have
foreseen the destructive powers of ideology and religion.
In The Prince, Machiavelli produced a work that he felt described what a
new prince must do to successfully take control of a state and keep it. The
circumstances that he wrote it under provide an explanation for the tone of the
book. Machiavelli was a patriot of Italy and wanted to see it become strong and
independent of the other nations that had been interfering in the affairs of Italy
at the time. Machiavelli blamed the Papacy for much of Italy's inability to sue. cessfully defend itself from the French and the Germans.
The content of The Prince, as stated above, is the course that a prince
must take in governing his new state. For Machiavelli there are two main ways
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that a prince may come to control a state. The first is by inheritance, the second
is by conquest. While not ignoring the first means, Machiavelli spends most of
the book focusing on attaining a state by conquest. He seeks to make his work
reflect things as they really are and what steps should be taken to make things
better. Sebastian De Grazia states in his book, Machiavelli in Hell that:
His moral philosophy rests on man's essence and its degeneration; his
political generalizations seek and rely on men as they act throughout
history, as they have been and are, not as they may once have been in a
hypothetical prehistory. 1
Machiavelli considered himself to be writing about how men were and not of
ideal men. It is due to this insight that he recommends some of the harsher
methods to secure power.
When a prince has taken a new territory by force Machiavelli recom
mends the extermination of all members of the former ruling family. This would
ensure that there would be no others who could contest the right of the prince
to rule in the new territory. He also counseled however, that the new ruler
should strive not to change the old laws or taxes. This would provide his new
subjects with a continuity and make them feel less threatened by the circum
stances of a change in their ruler. These recommendations represent the practi
cal use of power on two levels. The first is that the prince will have used his
power in the body of a military to take control of the new state. This is the
ultimate expression of power in bending another to one's will. The second level
is much more subtle. The prince changes very little of how the state is governed
to bring the people over to his side. Power is still exercised in bending the new
populace to his will, but it is used as a scalpel in this case; not the bludgeon of
an invasion.
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The violence that Machiavelli recommends at this point is not performed
without reason based in his observations of human nature as the following quote
reveals.
Concerning this, it should be noted that one must either pamper or do
away with men, because they will avenge themselves for minor offenses
while for more serious ones they cannot; so that any harm done to a man
must be the kind that removes any fear of revenge.2
This advice will, in Machiavelli's opinion, remove many sources of po
tential future difficulties. He also warns the new prince to be alert and look for
things that may pose problems in the future and address them as soon as they
come to his attention; " ...for once problems are recognized ahead of time, they
can be easily cured; but if you wait for them to present themselves, the medi
cine will be too late, for the disease will have become incurable."3 Taking con
trol of one's own destiny is clearly advocated by Machiavelli. This is borne out
in many parts of The Prince. He warns of the dangers of using troops that are
not loyal to the prince personally; also, he cautions the prince against those that
wish to play king-maker because they have power that could rival that of the
prince himself. Finally, he praises the prince who has relied on himself to make
events happen over those that have let Fortuna dictate the course that they have
followed. He states, " ...nevertheless, he who has relied upon fortune less has
maintained his position best."4 For Machiavelli the proactive use of power by
the prince is far better than the reactive use of power.
All of this requires a prince who can act when action is called for and can
act in whatever manner is called for. It is this aspect of The Prince that seems to
many to call for the prince to act in immoral ways. Machiavelli does not see this
as immoral, but rather merely practical, the means of securing the prime good,
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the state's stability. He states that the prince must be able to adapt to the situa
tion. "I also believe that the man who adapts his course of action to the nature
of the time will succeed and, likewise, that the man who sets his course of ac
tion out of tune with the times will come to grief."5 De Grazia expands on this
theme by saying;
To write of using qualities well or badly, emphasizes their possible util
ity toward some end and their use according to some judgement. They
become means, tools, instruments, detachable from the person using
them. Each tool, each quality, and its opposite, too, can be picked up and
plied or left lying on the ground.6
Thus, the prince is not immoral or even amoral. What he is and must be, is
willing to use the proper tool for the task before him.
Machiavelli also speaks to ambition in relation to princes and men in
general. "The desire to acquire is truly a very natural and normal thing: and
when men who can do so, they will always be praised and not condemned; but
when they cannot and wish to do so at any cost, herein lies the error and the
blame."7 Even though the word ambition is not expressly stated, it is what is
being discussed. Some ambition is normal and indeed, even viewed as good by
Machiavelli, but when one becomes ambitious beyond their capabilities to
achieve, that is when ambition becomes something negative and the cause of
many troubles. This leads once again to questions of morality and its relation to
the use of power.
Machiavelli's philosophy marks the very beginning of modem political
and moral philosophy and an evolution from the philosophies of the early
Greeks. The first major difference that can be spotted between the thought of
the two philosophies is the difference in the scale of which the philosophy is to
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be applied. Plato's Republic, while a model that he felt all city-states should
follow, can only be successful when used for a city-state. Trying to transpose it
to a modern state would be nearly impossible. Thucydides's ideas of the con
crete basis for power changed from the time of the Peloponnesian War to the
time of Machiavelli. Machiavelli saw his writings in The Prince as things that
were applicable to any and all who sought to rule. Machiavelli served as an
ambassador for Florence and conducted affairs among the fledgling nation-states.
He saw that France especially was developing a national identity; from which
he predicted the coming of nationalism, and the rise of the nation-state. He felt
that this was the future of all states, and he sought to emulate this trend in Italy.
The second difference is in the style of the leader. The philosopher-king
of The Republic is by no means a saintly figure, but he is much more compas
sionate to his citizens than Machiavelli's prince. The philosopher-king does
what he does because he has been trained to understand what justice is and
how it is to be maintained. To this end he implements policies to ensure that
each aspect of the city and each of the citizens is functioning as it and they
should. The prince is implementing policy so that he might control territories
that he has conquered with the only regard to his subjects being that they fear
or love, but do not hate him. However, as will be shown shortly, this changes in
The Discourses.
The third difference is in how the two ages view the felicity of the indi
viduals in the state. In the Platonic view each citizens felicity is maximized
when they are performing the duties that they are best at. It is only those at the
top that have the time or education to pursue other interests that would en
hance individual felicity. Specifics regarding Machiavelli shall be given below;
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however, in preface let it be said that the state envisioned by Machiavelli would
have broad boundaries as to the paths that individuals could pursue to felicity.
That as long as citizens are not opposing the prince and not disrupting the so
cial order, they may pursue whatever course they desire.
In his aspect as a moral philosopher Machiavelli sought to address what
would make a private person good given the fact that he held that men were at
the very least predisposed to do evil. Of Machiavelli De Grazia states, "Niccolo
the moralist writes of himself as a good man, urges others toward right con
duct, and recognizes it as his duty to teach good."8 He recognizes that there
are good and evil and endeavors to sway those around him to the path of good.
The felicity of individuals is important to Machiavelli. He is trying in
some of his other works, both political and moral, to explain why men act in the
ways they do and to encourage men to act in a moral manner, so that the felicity
of all may be enhanced. De Grazia paraphrases from The Discourses, "If men
set themselves in motion, the intrinsic cause of the motion is the recurrence and
instability of their appetites and desires. The pursuit of gratification pushes
men to incessant discontent."9 The solution that Machiavelli offers is moral
education. He offers many institutions that may help in giving this moral in
struction; religion, family, militia, and the state. Most important though, is the
prince himself. The prince is Machiavelli's one man setting the good example
that will influence all who see him. "...without the creation of one new ruler
the city will never rest unless the goodness of a single man, together with his
ability, maintains her freedom; ..."10 The theme of the character of the prince
setting the character of the state is repeated in several other chapters of The
Discourses. Indeed, if there is corruption in a city, the prince should look no
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further than himself; "A prince should not complain of any sin committed by
the people he governs, for such sins of necessity come either from the prince's
negligence or from the fact that he is stained with similar defects."11 There
fore, the prince must strive to set the good moral example for the people he
governs to ensure the character and stability of the state; which in turn, will
enhance the felicity of all who live there.
Machiavelli straddles the divide between descriptive realism and nor
mative realism in the respect that he feels that all of the normative decisions
that he makes of how the prince should behave are based on what he has seen
and described of the way that people act. He sought to represent life as it was,
not as a theoretical paradigm. It was from his view of life as it is that he derived
his theories of how a prince and others should act and what actions they should
take to achieve their goals. He also exemplifies many of the main characteris
tics of the machtpolitik school. It is the prince's power that will determine what
actions he can and cannot take. It is power that will allow him to conquer new
domains and incorporate them into his realm, and once there keep them; and it
is power that permits the social stability which allows for greater felicity.
Machiavelli also understands that there are different ways in which power can
be used. These are the tools that De Grazia speaks of. As is shown above,
Machiavelli is deeply concerned with the felicity of people in general. The job
of the prince is to create an order in which people will be both free and safe to
pursue their felicity as they see fit. The state is there to educate, guide, and
protect. Not to dictate, unless the stability of the state is compromised by the
judgements and behavior of citizens.
The next step in the evolution of power politics and international rela-
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tions is Thomas Hobbes. As shall be shown below, Hobbes presents a theory
that explains how states come into being and what factors govern their interac
tions with one another. Also, Hobbes presents what he calls Laws of Nature;
these laws give guidelines for interaction that are presented as a form of moral
ity.
When considering how states are to conduct affairs among one another,
it is first important to see how states came into existence and the functions they
presume to satisfy. If one can understand the circumstances and the beliefs that
formed the states as they are, then one may gain insight into why states behave
in the manner they do. When speaking of a state we are speaking of an imposi
tion of order on what normally would be a chaotic situation. It may not be as
bad as the State of Nature that Hobbes envisioned, but chaos in the most ex
treme revolutionary doctrines is tolerable only in the short run. Thus, the first
of the differences in the normative realist position that shall be discussed is the
argument of Order by Artifice versus Order as Natural or Divine.
Thomas Hobbes presents a theory in which predictable human relations
exist in nature and these natural tendencies of mankind can be found by man
through the exercise of reason and sy stematic observation. Hobbes was writ
ing on the eve of the Enlightenment, and has been called the first of the Enlight
enment thinkers by some, and it is in this context that he values reason so highly.
However, Hobbes relies on a particular form of reason that he called "Right
Reason", which he defined as the act of reasoning that will lead one to the proper
course of action. It is through the use of right reason that man will come to
know the descriptive Laws of Nature and be able to work his way out of the
State of Nature.
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It is the State of Nature, and the escape from it, that is the centerpiece of
Hobbes' philosophy. While some have tried to argue that Hobbes believed that
the State of Nature really existed, this is clearly not the case. Hobbes felt that if
the State of Nature existed at all it was amongst states in competition with one
another, or in the case of social incoherence. If anything on an individual scale
were to approach a State of Nature, it would be the type of situation that exists
when a country is wracked by civil war. The English Civil War was the back
drop against which Hobbes did much of his writing and therefore it is not sur
prising that it influenced what he wrote greatly, and stimulated his interest in
Thucydides' realism. It is probable that the reason Hobbes feared civil unrest
so greatly and was willing to sacrifice much to the sovereign to prevent it, was
the fact that he was forced to flee England during the war in fear of his life from
both sides in the conflict.
Hobbes described the State of Nature as a place in which all men are
equal in opportunity and all men have a right to all things due to the equality of
opportunity.12 The equality of opportunity has often been characterized as
even the weakest having the opportunity to kill the strongest because even the
strongest cannot be totally alert all of the time, or prevail against transient coa
litions of the weaker agents. The right of all men to all things easily creates
many opportunities for conflict between individuals. If one man were to desire
something that another man possessed, he would be within his rights to forc
ibly take the item from the other man. This state of affairs leads to the war of all
against all. In this war every man fights for himself with the over-riding goal of
all being self-preservation. Life in the State of Nature is " ... solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and short."13
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Hobbes saw the human ability to use "right reason" as the way in which
men would rise up out of the State of Nature. It is the ability to use reason that
Hobbes felt set men apart from the animals, even more than speech. Reason is
available to all men equally, just as discussed with the equality of opportunity
above. Men, using "right reason", would be able to perceive the Laws of Na
ture. The first Law of Nature is "That every man, ought to endeavor peace, as
far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may
seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war."14 The second Law of Nature is:
That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace,
and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down his right
to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men,
as he would allow other men against himself. 15
There are many other laws that can be deduced through reason, however, all of
the laws of nature can be summed up in a negative form of the Golden Rule:
"Do not unto others what you would not have them do unto you."16
Once men have deduced the laws of nature and are willing to follow
them, they are ready to leave the State of Nature. To do this, Hobbes believes
that men will enter into a contract with one another to form a society. T his
social contract is formed when the members of a group lay aside all of their
rights, except for the right to self-preservation, to the sovereign that has been
chosen from among them. The sovereign is imbued with the rights of all of
these men and remains able to use all of the rights as if he were still in the State
of Nature. The purpose of the sovereign is to provide for the safety of the mem
bers of the social contract. To this end Hobbes was willing to endow the sover
eign with extraordinary power. Because, as he says, "Power if it be extraordi
nary, is good, because it is useful for protection; and protection provides secu-
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rity. If it be not extraordinary, it is useless; for what all have equally is noth
ing."17 As long as he performs this duty well, the subjects may not question
his right to rule. If the sovereign were to unjustly accuse a man of violating a
law that the sovereign had made placing the individuals life in jeopardy; the
threatened individual would have the right to defend himself against the sov
ereign by whatever means were available to him. Even with the possibility of
the sovereign abusing the power that has been granted him by the members of
the contracting group, life under the social contract is sure to be better than life
in the State of Nature.
Hobbes' theory is clearly one of Order as Artifice. While the Laws of
Nature are to be found by "right reason" the resulting society is one made by
men. The power that the sovereign is given is total. The rights of all the mem
bers of the contracting group are given to the sovereign for the express purpose
of securing the safety of the group as a whole. One can view a contracting
group as a state. Thus, the conception of states competing with one another in
a State of Nature system. Hobbes values power for the security that it can pro
vide, not for the sake of power itself. Due to this factor, combined with the
equality of opportunity in the State of Nature; one can say that while Hobbes is
a practitioner of power politics, his ultimate concern is the felicity of individu
als, which is expressed as self-preservation.
In conclusion, both Machiavelli and Hobbes appear on the surface to be
embodiments of the machtpolitik doctrine. However, a closer reading of both
men reveals that they are ultimately concerned more with the felicity that can result
from the use of power rather than power itself. Machiavelli in his thoughts on how
to educate men to act morally and Hobbes in his Laws of Nature seek to give men
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moral guides to act by and by acting morally, to enhance the felicity of all.
1 De Grazia, p. 164
2 Machiavelli, TP, p. 496
3 Machiavelli, TP, p. 497
4 Machiavelli, TP, p. 501
5 Machiavelli, TP, p. 538
6 De Grazia, p. 306
7 Machiavelli, TP, p. 498
8 De Grazia, p. 73
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12 Hobbes, LEV, p. 183
13 Hobbes, LEV, p. 186
14 Hobbes, LEV, p. 190
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CHAPTER IV
TWENTIETH CENTURY MACHTPOLITIK
This chapter and the next will focus on the twentieth century and how
the positions of idealism, realism, and machtpolitik have been viewed and
evolved. Machtpolitik as mentioned above, has become diffused in this
century with no one particular philosopher being as clearly identifiable with
the doctrine as was Schmitt. The other two positions, idealism, and realism,
account for much more of the current thinking on international relations and
power politics.
At this point I feel it is necessary to reiterate the three topics that are the
focus of this thesis. First, does traditional machtpolitik still exist at this point in
the twentieth century? Second, how has the struggle between diplomacy and
democracy affected international relations. Has democracy so altered the way
in which diplomacy is conducted that diplomacy cannot hope to achieve any
thing meaningful? Third, what are the causes of international instability today.
This chapter will look at the idealist school, examine the position of Reinhold
Niebuhr, present the basics of Hans Morganthau's philosophy and how it re
lates to Hobbes and Schmitt and present the basic arguments in the diplomacy
versus democracy debate.
The idealist doctrine became popular in the wake of World War I, and
can be exemplified by Woodrow Wilson and his efforts to form the League of
Nations. He saw the League as the means by which to prevent any further
conflicts on the scale of the war that had just ended. However, it quickly be31
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came apparent that the powers that the League possessed were too few and too
ineffectual to prevent further conflict. Another aspect that is prevalent in the
idealist doctrine is the belief that man is inherently good and will be able, due
to this nature, to overcome his instincts for aggression and other destructive
behaviors. The United Nations has proven to be a more lasting testament to the
beliefs of the idealists, but as shall be elaborated on later, even it is a rather
ineffective body, especially when judged by idealist expectations.
One last aspect of the idealist position is that it is largely homogenous in
its thought. For the most part, its members all seek the same things; better
government, better living conditions, less conflict, and the enrichment of people's
lives. Though the visions of utopia may differ to some degree, all share the
belief that man is inherently better than what we, as a species, have exhibited so
far. There are many things that may inhibit this from being the case and they
will be discussed in more detail below. Part of the conclusion will be a discus
sion of Nietzsche as an eccentric, even radical, idealist. The form of his utopia is
quite different than most others, as are the members of it.
The position of realism stands in opposition to that of idealism, yet it
does not have the neat unified front of idealism. In fact, whereas the relation
ship between idealism and realism is dichotomous, we shall see that the rela
tionship between the different aspects of realism is anything but dichotomous.
Realism is divided, as I have argued, into descriptive realism and normative
realism, and compounding the issue is the remnants of the machtpolitik posi
tion. Descriptive realism, like idealism, is fairly homogenous in its approach
and doctrine. Descriptive realism seeks to describe the situation as it is without
making many value judgements as to what the proper or correct course to fol-
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low would be. Where realism becomes much more varied is in the school of
normative realism. Normative realists seek to describe how events should hap
pen and affairs of state should be conducted to ensure that a desired outcome is
the actual outcome. Starting with a recognition of political reality similar to
that of the descriptive realists they do make value judgements on events and
the conducting of international relations.
States are complex entities in themselves and the complexity increases
greatly when they interact with one another. This chapter and Chapter V will
attempt to shed light on some of the aspects of states, as they relate to the three
topics of machtpolitik as "might makes right", diplomacy versus democracy,
and the causes of international instability. Also, these chapters will try to present
the realist position as it currently exists. One aspect of states and international
relations that tends to get lost in the shuffle is how and when morals have a
place in these affairs. It is the issue of morality and its role in international
relations and how that role can be explained that will be the focus of the conclu
sion. Let us first examine Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morganthau and their
positions of normative realism.
Reinhold Niebuhr in his book Christianity and Power Politics, uses the
moral ethic of Christianity to make his argument about power politics. Niebuhr
says, "Christianity is a religion which measures the total dimension of human
existence not only in terms of the final norm of human conduct, which is ex
pressed in the law of love, but also in terms of the fact of sin."1 The law of love
is the basic premise of the Christian ethic, and it says to love your neighbor as
yourself. This ethic should lead people to act in unselfish ways. This is con
trary to the position of philosophers who believe in egoism, like Hobbes.
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However, Niebuhr quickly turns to issues of power. "The sins of pride
and lust for power and the consequent tyranny and injustice are all present, at
least in inchoate form, in individual life."2 The life of the individual is, for
Niebuhr, a microcosm of national and international politics. Tyranny and injus
tice are evils that should be avoided if possible, and corrected if not. These
conditions can be overcome however. "The way out lies in a transcendence of
reason over force sufficient to regulate, equilibrate, arbitrate and direct the play
of force and vitality in social life so that a maximum of harmony and a mini
mum of friction is achieved."3
It would seem that given the principles of Christianity, that a state that
was built upon them would be the best form of state to live in. Conflict in such
a state would be rare and when it did occur, it would be resolved quickly with
out resort to the extreme measures that are currently used. There have been
many dreams of this type of utopian state throughout history and many have
tried to claim divine revelation as the source for their utopian plans; but the
experience of life has fallen far short of these dreams. Niebuhr realizes that
these utopian dreams are limited by the imperfections of man and his sinful
nature. That even though the Bible describes what life will be like in Heaven,
man cannot hope to truly replicate that here on earth. The best that man can
hope for in the here and now is a state that follows the principles of Christianity
an ameliorates the suffering of this world.
Hans Morganthau in his book Politics Among Nations presents a posi
tion of what he calls "political realism". It is the basis that he uses to study
international relations and the power struggles that dominate the international
scene. Morganthau's principles of political realism echo Hobbes in Leviathan
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in that they both seek to find a structure that provides an explanation for hu
man behavior and society. For Hobbes, the Laws of Nature provide the frame
work, but the social contract is an artificial construct. Morganthau states; "Po
litical realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objec
tive laws that have their roots in human nature."4 Thus, order is imposed by
and from nature itself. On this issue the two are truly different in thought. The
major similarity is in the use of reason to understand human nature and behav
ior as well as the laws of nature to solve the problem of manufacturing the
international order. Morganthau's political realism provides the ground work
for his philosophy of which more will be said later.
The other side of the argument is that order is artificial and that it is
constructed by men and cannot be found lying around in nature just by the use
of reason. The majority of the twentieth century philosophers are on this side of
the argument. It is also important to note that Machiavelli takes this position as
well. He believed that the state had to be carefully constructed so that the prince
could properly rule over it and provide the stability that his subjects need.
However, for Machiavelli the only time that one could successfully use the ar
gument of Reason of State was when the stability of the state was immediately
at hand. He is providing the push over the top when it is ultimately unclear
whether the push is at all needed. Machiavelli also sees the state and country as
two separate entities that are merely coexisting. In The Discourses, it is country
and a patriots love of it that should come first, then the organization of the state.
The other philosophers of the twentieth century ; Henry Kissinger,
Zbginiew Brzezinski, Felix Oppenheim, John Stoessinger, and David Ziegler all
seem to follow Machiavelli's lead that the order is artificial and is made by man
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alone. Order on the international level is flawed for many reasons. The three
main devices for keeping order in this century have been diplomacy, the bal
ance of power, and the balance of terror. The viability of balance of power theory
has been disproved by the events of this century, notably, of course, the First
World War, and diplomacy and mutual terror have ascended as the chief means
for establishing international order, but even diplomacy has been challenged to
keep order in the latter part of this century. Both methods will be discussed
later.
Regardless of which side of the argument one regards, it should be ap
parent that the costs of disorder have become increasingly more unacceptable
in this century. Conflict is widespread and is instigated for almost any reason,
with consequences of unpredictable magnitude. The bodies, be they intrana
tional or international, whose duty it is to promote order and provide protec
tion are becoming less and less able to deal with the problems that confront
them. Either these bodies must be strengthened or new methods of promoting
order must be found to avoid the descent back into Hobbes' State of Nature.
The last topic of this chapter is the question of whether it is preferable to
have a single sovereign or a democracy. There are many levels of discussion to
this issue. As will be shown in the next chapter, the conditions of democracy
can have tremendous effects on how states conduct their foreign relations.
Normative realists differ extensively on the question of which ty pe of
government is better, democracy or a single sovereign. Clearly Hobbes and the
Machiavelli of The Prince are in favor of a single sovereign. Morganthau also
falls into this position. Kissinger, Brzezinski, Zeigler, Stoessinger, Oppenheim,
and Niebuhr all feel that democracy is the better form of government. This line
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of discussion has been followed for quite some time and shall be continued into
the foreseeable future.
Morganthau comes at the question from a different perspective than
Hobbes and Machiavelli, but eventually comes to the same conclusion, that a
single ruler is more desirable than a democracy. Morganthau was heavily in
fluenced by Bismarckian Germany and held Bismarck himself in high esteem.
Bismarck is perhaps the ideal of a single leader. While there was the German
king, it was Bismarck who created the web about himself by which he con
trolled almost every aspect of German politics and policy.
It is the system of international relations that existed during Bismarck's
time that Morganthau and others have lamented the loss of in the twentieth
century. Morganthau describes this change as a dissolution of values. "Two
factors have brought about this dissolution: the substitution of democratic for
aristocratic responsibility in foreign affairs and the substitution of nationalistic
standards of action for universal ones."5 The aristocratic system of conducting
international relations has passed and the sense of paternalism that accompa
nied it has passed as well. The effects of nationalism become more pronounced
in an environment where there are no truly shared standards as there were back
during Bismarck's time. Both of these changes serve to make it more difficult to
conduct international relations in the twentieth century.
These changes in style of leadership also have another affect on interna
tional relations. "The fluctuation of the policy makers in international affairs
and their responsibility to an amorphous collective entity has far-reaching con
sequences for the effectiveness, even for the very existence, of an international
moral order."6 The policy makers become beholden to an entity, that can and
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often does, change its mind at a whim. Therefore, the policies become incoher
ent and contradictory. This confusion, Morganthau feels, makes it increasingly
difficult or impossible to have an international moral order. Without interna
tional standards, it becomes harder to impose sanctions on those states that
have violated the international order.
Morganthau's philosophy implies that a single sovereign will avoid many
of the problems that have arisen in this century. The change in standards of
conducting international relations in this century has been a direct result of the
move from a single sovereign to more democratic states. This in turn can lead
to instability on the international level. Clearly, this is not in the best interests of
any members of the international community. A single sovereign, and a return
to diplomacy as it used to be practiced, might be able to avoid the contradic
tions and confusion that seem to mark international relations as they stand cur
rently.
On the other side are those who believe that a democratic system works
best in construing the will of the people and then acting upon it. Many of those
who place themselves on this side of the question are from societies that are
traditionally democratic, and in the case of Kissinger and Brzezinski, have
worked for the government of a democratic society. Democracy has seemed to
prove itself as the most stable style of government that exists today. Its' main
competitor, communism, has failed in almost every state in which it was the
form of government, and those states have also turned to democracy instead of
their centralized past.
There are several reasons that those who take the side of democracy do
so. Among the first is that many people are reluctant to put the degree of power
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that Hobbes would in a single person. The assumption is that one person can
not be trusted with that much power alone. That there needs to be others to
share the power with. Niebuhr states, "Power must be held under democratic
restraints because irresponsible power is always dangerous."7 Here Niebuhr
has clearly stated the fear that a single person cannot be trusted with the im
mense power of a state. Even though Hobbes believed that through the use of
reason the sovereign would not make bad laws, those like Niebuhr are not will
ing to take that chance. They believe that many people making a single deci
sion will make a better choice than what a single sovereign will. That having
several people involved with the decision making process will have the effect
of moderating policies and will not overreact in intense situations.
Another reason that democracy is preferred over a single sovereign is
that it is believed to represent the will of the people better and will be more
responsive to the people than a single sovereign. The representatives that the
people elect must be responsible to those people, because if they are not, they
will not be reelected. Thus, the will of the people is expressed during the elec
tion of their representatives. Ideally, as the will of the people changes so will
those who represent the people. Therefore, change in the government is achieved
without a great period of upheaval that characterizes the power struggles that
occur when a sovereign leaves office with no clear successor. The way in which
democracy is practiced makes it a more stable form of government.
A third reason that democracy is preferred by some to a single sovereign
is that it is believed that a democracy is better able to preserve the rights of the
individual citizen. Many fear that under a sovereign, the rights of the indi
vidual will be curtailed or dispensed with altogether. This is less likely to hap-
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pen in a democratic society, as the representatives of the people would prevent
such things from occurring. In most examples of totalitarianism in this century,
the citizens only have those rights that those in control allow them to have and
those rights can be suspended or revoked at a moments notice. This cannot
happen in a democracy. The process of making such decisions takes much longer
to complete which allows those who are opposed to certain laws or policies to
organize their resistance and influence those who are making these decisions.
Finally, it is believed that democracies are less likely to pursue foreign
policy goals through the use of force than are dictatorships and other totalitar
ian states. So, not only are democracies stable in themselves, they are also per
ceived as stabilizing forces on the international scene. The proponents of de
mocracy will say that they will not ask their citizens to fight and die for the state
without good cause, such as the defense of the state. Critics of constitutional
ism like Carl Schmitt and Max Weber will argue that democracies cannot ask
their citizens to do these things because there is no means by which the democ
racy can compel its citizens to do so.
The ultimate goal of international relations is stability and an absence of
hostilities between members of the international community. It appears that
the states which are governed by democratic principles contribute to this stabil
ity by their very nature. Therefore, it seems that democracy should be pre
ferred to a sovereign. However, where democracy tends to become unwieldy is
when the international order has destabilized and open hostility is imminent.
Democratic societies have to debate the possible courses of action and vote on
which one the state will act on. The sovereign, on the other hand, can take
unilateral action in the name of the state without the need for time consuming
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debate. When time is in short supply, as it is in most crisis situations, this differ
ence can be critical.
Democracy also places constraints on those who are conducting interna
tional relations for their state. Negotiators may reach an agreement with an
other state only to present the agreement to those in the democracy who have to
approve it and have the agreement rejected. The result in situations such as this
is that those negotiators now have less credibility when returning to the nego
tiation table. This lack of credibility will seriously affect how the negotiations
proceed. Under the old system of diplomacy, that Morganthau and others la
ment the passing of, it was understood that those involved in the negotiations
spoke for their states and the agreements that they reached would stand when
presented to the sovereign. The issue of how diplomacy has been changed by
the forces of nationalism, ideology, and democracy will be discussed more in
the next chapter, along with the two other main topics of the thesis.

1 Niebuhr, p. 2
2 Niebuhr, p. 13
3 Niebuhr, p. 62
4 Morganthau, p. 4
5 Morganthau, p. 241-242
6 Morganthau, p. 246
7 Niebuhr, p. 85-86

CHAPTERV
NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE REALISM
The focus of this chapter will be on examining in detail the two branches
of realist thought as they relate to the three main issues of this thesis. Briefly
restated these issues are; does machtpolitik still exist; the adversarial relation
ship of diplomacy and democracy; and searching for the causes of international
instability. Further comment on the answers to these questions found below
will follow in the conclusion.
This chapter shall address the main issues that face power politics and
normative realism today, building on the introductory discussion in the preced
ing chapter. The first is the divide between moral power politics and ordinary
power politics. The second is exactly how much of the machtpolitik tradition
remains in the twentieth century; which is a question that plagues normative
realism much more so than descriptive realism. Normative realism is divided
between the two points of view in regards to how morality should be included
when making decisions that involve national security. There are well respected
statesmen and philosophers on each side of the debate, as shall be seen below.
This is the area that has not received a large amount of attention, but it is one of
crucial importance now, and will continue to be in the future. Machtpolitik had
been a much more common political position in the world until this century.
The extreme changes that have occurred in this century I argue have weakened
the plausibility of this view and it is important to determine just how much of
this philosophy is still utilized by statesmen and diplomats.
42
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The division between ordinary power politics and moral power politics
leads to many other questions that form other divisions in the normative real
ism position, some of which will be discussed later. The divide in question
here, however, is whether morality should be considered when conducting in
ternational relations or not. As this division is wide and can be rather vague, it
will overlap with what has been said before and some aspects will be repeated
later in the paper. The side of moral power politics is represented by Oppenheim
and Morganthau. W hile the practitioners of ordinary power politics are
Brzezinski, Kissinger, Ziegler, Stoessinger, Hobbes, and Machiavelli. Niebuhr,
as I read him, straddles the line between the two and in doing so provides an
excellent transitional figure.
The first of the two sides to be considered in this chapter will be ordinary
power politics, which is solely concerned with the power relationships of a po
litical system. The fathers of the position are Thrasymachus, Thucydides, and
Machiavelli, and to an even greater degree Hobbes. They provided the concep
tual groundwork that all that have followed have built upon. As seen earlier,
Machiavelli gave birth to the modern form of realpolitik in The Prince. Hobbes'
book Behemoth is his work about the English Civil War, and as it expands on
themes that were brought out in Leviathan it is even more directly a work on
power relationships and their results. In it he looks at the events of the War and
also seeks to provide an explanation of why the war happened. W hat he finds
to be the cause of the war is ambition. Hobbes had earlier formulated two defi
nitions of ambition in Man and Citizen. The first definition is this: "The love of
money, if it exceeds moderation, is called covetousness; the love of political
power, if immoderate, ambition; for these perturb and pervert the mind."1 We
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have seen that political authority is not necessarily a bad thing to Hobbes, in
deed, given the powers and legitimacy that he lavishes on the sovereign in Le
viathan, political power is definitely seen as a good. However, if one seeks
more power than one really needs, and if this desire is driven by utopian dreams,
Hobbes feels that this corrupts that person and that corruption interferes with
their ability to reason, making them unfit to rule.
The second manner in which Hobbes seeks to define ambition is in an
analogy to the myth of Prometheus. It is as follows:
It seems the ancients who made that same fable of Prometheus, pointed
at this. They say that Prometheus, having stolen fire from the sun, formed
a man out of clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with
a perpetual gnawing in his liver. Which is, that by human invention,
which is signified by Prometheus, laws and justice were by imitation
taken from monarchy; by virtue whereof, as by fire removed from its
natural orb, the multitude, as the dirt and dregs of men, was as it were
quickened and formed into a civil person; which is termed aristocracy or
democracy. But the author and abettors being found, who might securely
and quietly lived under the natural jurisdiction of kings, do thus smart
for it; that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with per
petual cares, suspicions, and dissensions.2
It is from this passage that the concept of "Promethean Ambition" comes.
The meaning of this definition of ambition gains more significance when view
ing it in light of the struggles between Cromwell and Parliament and Hobbes'
views on the two. He saw them as usurping the natural order of things and as
a result, being burdened with all of the duties and responsibilities of the monar
chy. Yet, with many making the decisions that had until then been made by
one, the affairs of the state were not being conducted smoothly. The intrigues
that resulted from the factions in the new government Hobbes would have lik
ened to Jupiter's punishment of Prometheus. Therefore, Promethean Ambition
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(or "vainglory"), including the realization of utopian moral schemes, is an am
bition that outstrips one's ability to control what one has achieved.
One of Hobbes greatest fears was that Promethean Ambition would come
to be combined with the utopian dreams of one person or another. Utopian
projects always seek to remake the world in a more "perfect" way. The main
problem is that what one person considers perfect, another may consider hell.
Hobbes feared that a person or group following a utopian dream would be
gripped by ambition of the Promethean type and try to remake the world in
their image whatever the cost, reason being unseated. A situation of this type
would cause a great upheaval in the social order and may plunge the state into
civil war. As has been noted above, this is the one thing that Hobbes most
sought to avoid. The destruction of peace that would be wrought by this type
of zealotry would be akin to the chaos of the state of nature and totally unac
ceptable for the advancement of mankind.
In reviewing both definitions, they both have in common an ultimate
end that is not pleasant for those involved. The lack of reason affects the ability
to make good decisions and the inability to control what is happening around
oneself tends to lead to even more bad decisions. The final result of either form
of ambition seems to be the guaranteed destruction of either what has been
achieved through ambition, or the ambitious person and the overreaching move
ment.
One of the most common arenas for ambition to present itself is that of
international relations. States compete with one another for scarce resources
and for recognition at the international level. Less developed states seek to
emulate those like the United States and Western Europe, who have robust econo-
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mies and all of the benefits that result. In times past, armed conflict was the
primary means of expressing this ambition. However, as mankind developed
greater civility, diplomacy became the preferred stage on which to act out ambi
tion and to resolve disputes. This situation came about under the aegis of the
system of aristocratic government that was the norm in Europe. The birth of
representative democracy has changed the way in which diplomacy is conducted
greatly; as will be shown below.
In looking at how international relations and diplomacy have been con
ducted over the last two to three hundred years one wonders if morality was a
concern that has been forgotten in the rush of time or have power political con
siderations come to dominate the affairs of states so much that morality has
been squeezed out. Did the form of diplomacy that existed in the past allow for
considerations of morality? Or was it only a carefully constructed image of
moral consideration that has been mistaken for morality in the old system of
diplomcacy? As shall be shown shortly, the manner in which diplomacy is con
ducted has changed dramatically in a relatively short period of time. The ad
vent of democratic societies has changed the way in which states conduct af
fairs with one another because of leaders now having to answer for their ac
tions to an electorate at home.
Another issue in the change in form of diplomacy is that it now must be
conducted with great urgency in many cases. With the advancement of tech
nology in both the arenas of communications and weapons, it is more crucial
that there not be any misunderstandings when diplomats meet in attempts to
settle differences and prevent open conflict from occurring. As shall be dis
cussed below, these and other factors combine to make it difficult to consider
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moral ramifications of actions taken on the international level. Clearly, there
was more time to make such decisions in the past; however, that does not mean
that the morality of actions was considered. The question for today is whether
or not the shift in the way that international relations are now conducted pre
cludes moral issues from being discussed.
The two main tools of power politics are diplomacy and the resort to
sactions, including armed force. The topic of armed force will be addressed
later in the chapter. For now all that will be considered is diplomacy.
In his book, American Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger states that there
have been a number of changes that have affected the way diplomacy is con
ducted.
The revolutionary character of our age summed up in three general state
ments: (a) the number of participants in the international order has in
creased and their nature has altered; (b) their technical ability to affect
each other has vastly grown; (c) the scope of their purposes has ex
panded.3
The changes that have occurred in diplomacy due to these factors are truly dra
matic.
The increased number of actors on the international scene has served to
muddy the picture of how things really are. The break-up of the former Soviet
Union and several of its satellites has created much chaos in the way things
operate in Eastern Europe and Asia, making concrete information on what the
current situation actually is hard to come across. This has also been repeated in
Africa, with the continued conflicts there making reliable information a valu-.
able commodity. This picture becomes even more vague when the new non
state actors, such as multinational corporations, are also thrown into the mix
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with their own agendas; agendas partially beyond state control.
Technology has rapidly advanced this century. This rapid advancement
has increased the speed of communications across the world. A message that
once would have taken months to arrive at its destination may now only take a
matter of seconds. Thus, diplomats and heads of state have greater access to
one another. Some of the same technology that has increased our ability to
communicate, has also increased our ability to destroy, and the speed with which
destruction is visited. States now have the capability to strike at another on the
other side of the world at a moments notice.
The combination of the above two factors means that states and other
actors on the international scene have much more to consider than in times
past. All members of the international community are now to some degree
concerned with the environment since we now know that an event, such as a
nuclear meltdown, can affect large portions of the planet in addition to the place
that it happens at. Such things were not considered even as recently as fifty
years ago. States also have to be aware of the purposes of multinational corpo
rations that have affairs all over the world. Many other organizations have also
come to affect the ways in which states conduct their internal and international
affairs.
All of these changes affect the manner in which diplomacy is now con
ducted. Kissinger, Morganthau, G.F. Kennan, and others lament that the way in
which affairs used to be conducted have faded into history. Under the old or
der, a group of diplomats could meet with one another and conduct negotia
tions given a set of protocols that all knew and accepted. Kissinger says; "A
similar outlook about aims and methods eases the tasks of diplomacy - it may
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even be a precondition for it. In the absence of such a consensus, diplomats can
still meet, but they lose the ability to persuade."4 Brzezinski feels much the
same.
...the probabilities are that a group of skilled practitioners of power,
sharing a common outlook about the use of power and a common expe
rience in the use of force, are likely to be the more adept at weighing the
advice of intelligence and military experts, and at embarking with con
sistency on a selected course.5
He is speaking of how domestic policy is made, however, it is very easy to ex
tend this to the diplomatic arena; where he is in agreement with Kissinger.
John Stoessinger also views diplomacy as crucial to the conduct of af
fairs amongst states. He states; "Diplomacy may be defined as the conduct of
international relations by negotiation. It is a process through which nations
attempt to realize their national interests."6 In this arena, the subtle, skillful
use of power is favored above the brute force methods involved in open con
flict. Stoessinger also feels that it is through diplomacy that the world commu
nity strives to maintain international order. Often the implication of the com
bined power of several states may serve to persuade a state to a different course
of action that will prove more acceptable to the international order.
Stoessinger presents his opinion of the difference between the morality
that he sees in international relations to the type of morality that is generally
regarded to exist in personal relationships.
The crucial difference between interpersonal and international relations
is not that the former permit moral behavior, whereas the latter do not.
It resides, rather, in the fact that personal behavior is usually judged by
an ethic of intention while that of the statesman is essentially one of con
sequence.7
The difference is crucial. In interpersonal relationships, if one person does some-
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thing and it does not turn out for the best, the person hurt by the action, with
adequate time for retrospection can see what the other was intending to do and
forgive the offending person for the result. While this is not always the case nor
is it easy in interpersonal relations, it seems to be much more possible than in
international relations. In international relations, the intentions of the diplomat
do not count, it is only the result of their actions that is morally judged what
ever the intention may be.
What are some of the conditions of today's international relations that
make it so difficult to take into account morality and the intentions of other
actors? First, there is the speed with which diplomacy must now be conducted.
As was mentioned above, this might be the greatest factor. With the increased
ability for an individual state to massively affect the international order, it has
become necessary that solutions can be reached in a short amount of time. It
has become more the norm than the exception that hostilities have been averted
just hours before their outbreak than in times past. The rushed nature of these
types of diplomacy certainly leaves little, if any, time to reflect on the moral
issues involved. All that is considered is the power political goal of keeping the
international order intact.
This need for swift resolution to disputes is a result of the second issue;
the increased levels of tension that exist in the international order and how
quickly these already heightened levels can skyrocket even further. A prime
example of this type of situation is the Cuban Missile Crisis. An incident in the
already high tension level of the Cold War, spiked the tension level up even
further to the point where the world collectively held its breath. Although the
threat of nuclear conflict has been reduced since that time, levels of tension
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remain high as the mechanisms for maintaining international order start to break
down and lose their effectiveness . Given the level of open hostility that cur
rently exists in the world, it would seem safe to argue that increased tension has
lowered the flashpoint for conflict. It is this heightened level of tension that
necessitates that diplomacy be conducted at the breakneck pace that it is today.
The third factor that affects how much morality may be considered in
conducting diplomacy is the secrecy in which negotiations take place. Under
the old style of diplomacy, the negotiators could be relatively assured that they
could conduct their affairs in secrecy so as not to be affected by outside influ
ences. Today, while the concrete particulars of negotiations may not be known
by the population at large, citizens of democratic societies are aware of what
their governments are doing on the international scene. The abundance of news
sources that are available to the average person today far outstrip those avail
able even just sixty years ago, let alone a hundred and sixty years ago. The
result is that even secret diplomacy is rarely truly secret any longer. Which
means that, in democratic societies, the will of the people must be considered in
the conducting of affairs of state. This consideration of the collective will of so
many people makes it yet again much harder to consider issues of morality and
intentions when conducting international relations.
David Zeigler in his book War, Peace. and International Politics also ad
dresses issues of diplomacy even though the book largely focuses on armed
conflict. He does feel that diplomacy is an effective tool to use in settling dis
putes among nations. Diplomats have served a huge role in the conducting of
international relations for most of history. It is still the role of diplomats to
represent their states to other states or in non-state organizations such as the
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United Nations, and this does not seem likely to change in the immediate fu
ture.
Both Brzezinski and Stoessinger also seek to address the role that ideol
ogy plays in the conducting of diplomacy. Brzezinski feels to the Cold War was
primarily driven by the competing ideologies of the USA and USSR. Each side
was driven by an ideology, yet they each found the ideology of the other abhor
rent. Brzezinski states; "It is assumed that to be ideologically motivated is to be
unrealistic, irrational, dogmatic, and fanatical."8 Clearly, the common percep
tion is that ideology will be an impediment to the conduct of diplomacy.
It is ideology that Machiavelli failed to take into account in formulating
his philosophy. He was much more concerned with the aspects of building a
national identity for Italy that he did not notice what a motivating force ideol
ogy could be. This is even more acute when one applies it to religious zealotry.
Machiavelli saw the church solely as the institution that had kept Italy from
becoming a nation and therefore at the mercy of France and Germany. He never
would have foreseen events like those in Iran and the extremes that religious
fundamentalism have gone to the world over; he was even silent of Europe's
entry in the sixteenth century into the horrors of the age of religious wars.
Machiavelli would also not have understood the Nazi ideology and how that
ideology came to dominate the entire state, blinding the vision of its leaders.
Ideologies have taken on lives of their own at several times in this century and
the results have been overwhelmingly negative when this has happened.
As stated above Niebuhr provides a transition from ordinary power poli
tics to moral power politics. This is due to his firm belief in the Christian ethos
and the fact that he still is willing to admit that power is important. Given his
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Augustinian foundations of a morality based on Christianity and a pessimistic
psychology, one would expect him to follow the doctrine of stark original sin as
the cause for all of the woes of mankind. However, he takes a different track. It
is not the fault of our nature, but rather our denial of our nature. "Man is a
sinner not because he is finite but because he refuses to admit that he is. And
there is no life which is not involved in this tragic self-deception."9 We are less
rebels against God, as we are enticed by notions of perfection - Hobbes' "vain
glory" returns. Thus, sin is committed because we refuse to admit that there are
limits to what we can do and how we can do them. What then are the results of
this fact? Niebuhr would argue that the abuse of power is what results. This
abuse of power would deprive us of true choice.
We never have the chance to choose between pure tyranny and pure free
dom; we can only choose between tyranny and relative democracy. We
do not have the choice between war and perfect peace, but only between
war and the uneasy peace of some fairly decent and stable equilibrium
of social forces. 10
This abuse of power creates hostility in the world, which given the Christian
ethic is to be avoided at all costs.
Niebuhr feels that the morality that is practiced by people in democra
cies is inadequately equipped to deal with situations on the international scene
when dealing with non-democratic or ideologically driven systems.
Since politics in general and international politics in particular never dis
suaded a nation from a desired course of action, this simple moralism of
the democratic peoples represents a rather naive application of principles
drawn from the observation of individual behavior to the problem of
collective behavior.11
If this is truly the case, is it any wonder that the United Nations is hardly able to
resolve any international disputes in a peaceful manner. The Christian ethic of
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turning the other cheek will not work in the hostile environment of advanced
conflict. As a response it will prove wholly inadequate and will probably lead
to further aggression by the offending party.
Even given Niebuhr's belief in the Christian ethic, he at the end is forced
to acknowledge that power is the main drive in international politics. "Every
one else knows that all political struggles are power-political struggles, in the
sense that contending forces avail themselves not only of rational and moral
arguments but of whatever social power they control."12 The drive for power
is increased as one achieves more power, and the power previously acquired is
used to further the drive for more power.
What then are some conclusions that one can draw from the position of
ordinary power politics? First, that all of politics, both internal and interna
tional, are power politics. All of the writers considered above will admit that in
the final analysis all political behavior becomes a question of power and who
can persuade whom.
A second conclusion is that diplomacy is the preferred method for the
resolution of disputes. Diplomacy has been used for as long as history has been
recorded, and while it has been radically changed in this century, it will con
tinue to be used as the primary way for states to communicate with one an
other. Diplomacy may often be merely a prelude to conflict, but it is also the
best way to resolve conflict.
Third, ideology and nationalism will continue to affect the perspectives
of individual states. Brzezinski, in his book Out of Control, addresses the af
fects that ideologies have on states. He says; "Together, nationalism, idealism,
and rationalism - interacting with the spread of literacy, industrialization, and
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urbanization - created the brew which, when transformed, subsequently led to
the monstrous metamyths of the twentieth century."13 Among the metamyths
are Nazism and communism. These metamyths are destructive, and to the popu
lace at large, they are important in and of themselves. However, these metamyths
have no more depth than a bumper sticker and will eventually cause more prob
lems than they solve. This is because the myth is a phantasm of true internal
ized belief. Communism at the end, had become nothing more than an institu
tionalized lie that could no longer sustain itself.
The metamyth that has enveloped the United States and many of its
western allies Brzezinski calls permissive cornucopia, and it is a particularly
insidious and debilitating myth. "The term 'permissive cornucopia' can hence
be applied to a society in which everything is permitted and everything can be
had."14 This, if anything, describes the condition that has come to be the norm
in the United States. If somebody wants to do something, they do and the con
sequences be damned. The problem that accompanies this attitude is serious.
It leads to a society and state in which there is no deep moral center that guides
peoples' actions. If this attitude and lack of moral center permeates the general
populace, how long can it be before our leaders are gripped by the same?
This is what Brzezinski feels that the result of all of this will be.
In the absence of some shared philosophical criteria that help to define
the choice on behalf of which power is exercised, the sheer acquisition
and then exercise of power then becomes haphazard, motivated mostly
by self-interest and expediency, and driven by its own inner logic.15
Hardly an effective foundation upon which to mount an effective foreign policy.
The other side of power politics is moral power politics. This position
has been expanded in the twentieth century by Oppenheim and Morganthau.
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As with Hobbes, Niebuhr, et al, this position is reluctant to endorse state pur
suit of avowedly moral objectives. This reluctance is due to what they see as
the likely outcome of combining morality with state politics and the resulting
fervor that can take on the same tone as religious zealotry. An example of this
type of situation is Iran under the government of the muslim fundamentalists.
However, the positions that they take are better than the total lack of concern
with morality that is exhibited by the position of ordinary power politics.
In Politics Among Nations, Morganthau seeks to put forth a theory of
political realism. When one sees a phrase like political realism, one would not
expect to find a theory that embraces morality in any way. However, Morganthau
and a number of others, use it as a platform on which morality enters the arena
of power politics.
When Morganthau speaks of political realism, he has a set group of prin
ciples in mind. These points are crucial to understanding the positions that he
holds and shall now be discussed. First, "Political realism believes that politics,
like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in
human nature."16 This echoes back to some of Hobbes' ideas on natural law
and how its comes to be understood by man. These objective laws are available
to all who are able to use reason. The laws will be revealed by reason, and can
only be fully understood in the light of reason. Reason is the guide that helps to
navigate the problems of international relations and will open the door for
morality to enter the realm of politics.
The second principle seeks to address what Morganthau views as some
of the common fallacies that we tend to fall into when looking at issues of inter
national relations and power. It is as follows. "The main signpost that helps
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political realism find its way through the landscape of international politics is
the concept of interest defined in terms of power."17 Morganthau places con
siderations of power as the second principle in his theory of international rela
tions, and for good reason. He states, "The concept of interest defined as power
imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into
the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of
politics possible."18 It is this intellectual structure that allows one to avoid the
fatal fallacies that Morganthau describes.
The fallacies that Morganthau describes serve only to cloud the issues of
international relations, and prevent people from viewing things as they really
are. The following two quotes lay out these fallacies. First, "A realist theory of
international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the con
cern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences."19 Second,
"A realist theory of international politics will also avoid the other popular fal
lacy of equating foreign policies of a statesman with his philosophic or political
sympathies, and of deducing the former from the later."20 Morganthau be
lieves that commiting any of these fallacies will blind one to the realities of the
international situation and lead to faulty evaluation and therefore, incorrect
action.
The third principle of realism is: "Realism assumes that its key concept
of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid,
but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for
all."21 In this statement Morganthau universalizes his concept of interest de
fined as power. This fact of universalizability is very important in later parts of
Morganthau's theory. It is in the fourth principle that morality enters the realm

58
of realism. "Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political ac
tion."22 Here, Morganthau acknowledges that political actions can and often
will have moral ramifications or can be interpreted in the light of morality.
However, just as he acknowledges the role of morality in the fourth prin
ciple, the fifth principle provides a warning about morality. The fifth principle
is as follows; "Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a
particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe."23 Once again
Morganthau is warning against identifying a universal with a particular, just as
he did when refusing to give the concept of interest defined as power a fixed
definition. This principle also deprives nations of the claim that they are more
correct in their morality than another nation, thus, hopefully weakening inter
national contention.
Each state has certain goals that they strive to achieve.As has been noted,
the two primary means that states use to achieve these goals are diplomacy and
armed conflict. In both cases power is exercised. Morganthau says of these
efforts; "Statesmen and peoples may ultimately seek freedom, security, pros
perity or power itself....But whenever they strive to realize their goals by
means of international politics, they do so by striving for power."24 In this
view all efforts and goals come to be characterized by the use of power. In
essence, everything on the international scene becomes a question of power.
If one goes by the assumption that all policies employed by all states are
nothing more than the striving for power, questions of international relations
become questions of who has the power and who is going to be able to keep
power. Yet, statesmen are not so crass as to put problems in this plain light.
Morganthau says that statesmen conceal this struggle for power. "That is to
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say: the true nature of the policy is concealed by ideological justifications and
rationalizations."25 Ideologies serve to camouflage the power issues with rheto
ric. This hiding of the real purpose of the policy may be from both foreign and
domestic observers. "In other words, while all politics is necessarily pursuit of
power, ideologies render involvement in that contest for power psychologically
and morally acceptable to the actors and their audience."26
Morganthau is saying that ideology serves both to sugarcoat and to am
plify the truth of the matter. That the principles that we hold individually will
not allow us to sanction the things that need to be done in the pursuit of power,
yet they must be done or, in its pathological mode, to drive nations to self
righteous recklessness. So we hide the truth behind the ideology and make it
the actor instead of ourselves. This is the only way in which we can accept
some of the policies that states embark on. For example, if we in the United
States had viewed the Russian people during the fifties and sixties as we do
now, it is doubtful that there would have been a Cold War; it requiring that each
view the other as an "Evil Empire". It was the ideology that allowed both sides
to hold incorrect views of each other and continue the struggle for power by
whatever means that were necessary.
Morganthau also says that these struggles as they are played out in inter
national relations so they are within the societies of individual states. Societies
institute means to regulate behavior inside their boundaries. This is part of the
authority of the sovereign in its attempts to protect individual citizens and their
rights. However, Morganthau sees something else behind the laws and legal
systems.
All the social instrumentalities and institutions relevant to the different
competitive devices of society serve the purpose, not of eliminating the
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struggle for power, but of creating civilized substitutes for the brutality
and crudeness of an unlimited and unregulated struggle for power. 27
In this, one can see the influence of Hobbes and his view of how men behave in
the State of Nature. When all are equal with no supreme force to keep them in
check, they will prey upon one another without remorse. The struggle for power
comes to characterize both international and interpersonal relations. Interper
sonal relationships have more of an overawing force, social expectations and
government laws, governing them; there is no such equivalent on the interna
tional level.
Morganthau begins his discussion of the role of morality in international
relations with another warning for those who want to look at morality in light
of political realism.
A discussion of international morality must guard against the two ex
tremes of either overrating the influence of ethics upon international
politics or underestimating it by denying that statesmen and diplomats
are moved by anything but considerations of material power. 28
Morganthau is encouraging a balance when looking at issues of morality. One
cannot use the explanation of all things as a struggle for power as a blunt in
strument. Other things will motivate statesmen and people besides power. Also,
as stated earlier, considerations of intentions are not to be looked at. However,
there are many other factors that affect how morality is applied on the interna
tional scene. Morganthau feels that it is in this area that questions of the role of
nationalism come into play.
In Morganthau's opinion nationalism has served as a particularly divi
sive force on the international scene in our time. In some ways, it could be
considered responsible for the breakdown or shift in the way diplomats con
duct their affairs. It is the influence of nationalism that has wrecked the univer-
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sal view of international relations that was shared by diplomats up until this
century. Morganthau states; "Actually the spirit of nationalism, once it had
materialized in national states, proved not to be universalistic and humanitar
ian, but particularistic and exclusive."29 Thus, the doctrine of one nation, one
state came to be. Morganthau feels that this doctrine has created many prob
lems for international relations. Nationalism has combined with religious zeal
otry and fostered societal arrogance that makes conducting international rela
tions much more difficult if not altogether impossible.
Morganthau also cites two effects that nationalism has on issues of mo
rality. "First, there is the enormously increased ability of the nation state to
exert moral compulsion upon its members."30 And, "Second, there is the ex
tent to which loyalty to the nation requires the individual to disregard univer
sal moral rules of conduct."31 Nationalism, then, has the net effect of bending
its citizens to believe that their nation is right no matter what; and also of loos
ening the attachments that citizens may have to a higher moral order or their
aspirations to a supranational power. This could be the reason for the failure of
the League of Nations and the relative ineffectiveness of the United Nations;
although the psychological cynicism of Hobbes and Schmitt hovers over all ex
planations. Morganthau states; "Finally, there is today, in consequence of the
other two factors, much less chance for the individual to be loyal to suprana
tional ethics when they are in conflict with the moral demands of the nation."32
We can conclude from the above discussion that Morganthau does not
see morality as a mechanism to preserve peace and order mainly due to the fact
that nationalism tends to twist moral claims made by any one state; and
Morganthau will not allow any state to claim moral superiority given that the
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claim is tainted by nationalism. This leads back to the other two methods men
tioned earlier: balance of power and world public opinion. We have seen in
our time that balance of power theory is insufficient to keep the peace among
nations; World War I put the final nail in the coffin of the theory. Instead of
preventing the conflict, the balance of power that existed served only to spread
the conflict more quickly to the entire continent and eventually the world. Some
might argue that the Cold War is an example of a balance of power situation.
This can be disproved in two ways. First, a balance of power must have a third
member to moderate the power of the other two. The situation that existed
between the United States and the USSR was clearly a bipolar situation with no
moderating third power. Second, the equilibrium that was present was due
more to a balance of terror than a balance of power. Both sides knew that a
direct confrontation would result in the decimation of both and neither was
willing to risk the horrors that would result from such a confrontation. Thus,
the balance of power was transformed into a balance with mutual assured de
struction, the only device restraining open conflict.
That leaves the hope that world public opinion would be sufficient to
prevent states from going to war or becoming aggressive in their behavior to
other states. Of this idea Morganthau says;
The two factors from which the mistaken belief in the existence of a world
public opinion originates are the common experience of certain psycho
logical traits and elemental aspirations which unite all mankind, and the
technological unification of the world. What has been neglected is the
fact that, everywhere in the world, public opinion with regard to inter
national affairs is molded by the agencies of national politics. 33
The glasses of nationalism and other ideological intoxicants, notably cultural
and religious differences, cloud our perceptions of events and maybe prevent
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us from seeing things as they actually are. Each nation is sufficiently different
to have another view of what the situation actually is.
Therefore, the question now posed is if world public opinion is at all
possible. Morganthau replies in the negative.
Thus the contrast between the community of psychological traits and
elemental aspirations, on the one hand, and the absence of shared expe
riences, universal moral convictions, and common political aspirations,
on the other, rather demonstrates its impossibility, as humanity is consti
tuted in our age.34
Further, "World public opinion, however, ceases to operate at all as one united
force whenever a war threatens to break out which affects the interests of a
number of nations."35 Therefore, world public opinion appears impossible
due to the fact that as humans, we do not all share the same experiences and
therefore view the same thing in many different ways and that states will not
involve themselves in the censure of another state unless the act of aggression
interferes with its own interests. With these weaknesses, it seems certain that
world public opinion will never be a strong enough force to prevent conflict
among states. It was not the outcry of the world that made Saddam Hussien
remove his troops from Kuwait; it was the military might of several nations
working in concert. However, even the coalition that defeated Iraq did not
agree on all of the measures that were taken to do so, and not all of the states
involved participated equally.
To sum up Morganthau's position. First, he proposes a realist view of
international politics that necessitates all politics being viewed as power
politics. Second, morality is to be considered, but just as everything else, it is
to be viewed in balance with and in terms of the struggle for power. Also,
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under a realistic view of politics, it is very hard to make moral judgements.
Third, he laments the loss of universal ideas and morals held by diplomatic
elites which once kept the world somewhat bound together. Now that they
are gone, it is increasingly difficult for states to find common ground on
which to build negotiations. The cause of this breakdown of universals is the
rise of nationalism and popular politics and the ideologies that accompany
them. It has weakened any attachments that people or states might have to
something on a supranational level. In summation of the effects of national
ism Morganthau states;
Nationalism, identified as it is with the foreign policies of individual
nations, cannot restrain these policies; it is itself in need of restraint. Not
only has it fatally weakened, if not destroyed, the restraints that have
come down to us from previous ages, it has also supplied the power
aspirations of individual nations with a good conscience and a Messi
anic fervor.36
Felix Oppenheim's positions of moral power politics is presented in Moral
Principles in Political Philosophy and expanded upon in The Place of Morality
in Foreign Policy. In the first book Oppenheim describes what he feels is the
way in which morality should be viewed in political philosophy. He analyzes
the positions of many philosophers past and present in search of a definitive
way in which moral principles can be determined. The second book is more of
a practical guide of when and how morality should be used by statesmen or a
state in planning their foreign policies.
In Moral Principles, Oppenheim begins by rigorously laying out the domi
nant positions of how morality is viewed and those that have shaped the debate
over morality. The book is characterized by metaethical questions, that
Oppenheim is trying to resolve. Oppenheim says of this,
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The two most important problems of metaethics concern (1) the mean
ing of value words such as 'good' or 'preferable' and moral terms such
as 'right' or 'duty'; (2) the logic of moral discourse: Are moral principles
objectively either true or false? If they are, by what method can such
principles be justified? 37
The two opposing views on whether moral principles can be objectively true or
false are value-cognitivism and value-noncognitivism.
Oppenheim defines value-cognitivism by saying that; " ...value
cognitivism affirms that valuational and moral statements are assertions about
objective states of affairs and have, as such, cognitive status; that is, they are,
and can be known to be, either true or false."38 As one can surmise, value
noncognitivism asserts the opposite. Here, however, is Oppenheim's defini
tion.
Basic ethical principles have no cognitive status; they cannot be know to
be either true or false because they are not true or false; and they are
neither true nor false because they are not true or false; and they are
neither true nor false because they do not affirm or deny that something
is the case.39
The one thing that Oppenheim says that value-cognitivists and valuenoncognitivists agree on is judgements of rationality. He states;
Both cognitivists and noncognitivists agree that judgements of rational
ity do have cognitive status. Judgements of rationality concern the ad
equacy of the choice of a course of action or policy in view of attaining a
desired state of affairs, judged on the basis of the information available
to an actor in a given situation.40
These types of decisions are not issues of morality and that is why the two sides
can agree.
Oppenheim also lays out two other positions to frame the debate, Natu
ralism and Intuitivism. He says, "Naturalism in general holds that certain moral
principles can be shown to be true by reducing them somehow to true descrip-
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tive generalizations."41 A feat that is much easier said than done. Of Intuition
ism, "Intuitionists agree with naturalists that ethical terms refer to objective
characteristics, but interpret them as designating 'nonnatural' or 'simple' prop
erties which cannot be further defined."42 These then are the four views that
frame the discussion for the rest of the book.
Moral statements or judgements are viewed as "ought" statements, be
cause they imply how something ought to be or how someone ought to act. Of
these types of statements Oppenheim says; "In most cases, an 'ought' state
ments cannot be derived from another 'ought' statement alone but only from
the former together with another, factual, premise."43 A second characteristic
that Oppenheim feels all moral judgements should share is that they be
universalizable. With these conditions and definitions in mind we shall look at
Oppenheim's discussions of various moral philosophical positions.
Plato and his Theory of the Forms is the first that Oppenheim comments
on. It is through knowledge of the Forms that Plato felt one would gain under
standing of what is right and wrong. This knowledge of the Forms was not
available to everyone and took training in those that were capable of perceiving
them to truly understand them. Of Plato's system Oppenheim says;
I do not believe that Plato has provided an objective criterion for the
truth of insights into the goodness of things in general and of political
institutions in particular. I conclude, therefore, that Platonic insight, far
from leading to objective ethical knowledge, is merely another name for
anyone's subjective moral commitments.44
The next position to be examined is that of Carl Friedrich and subse
quently John Calvin. Oppenheim uses the positions as examples of the intui
tive school.
Friedrich uses the term 'experience' to refer to the discovery of values as
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of facts. However, his use of the expression 'value-blind' suggests the
view that values and facts are not experienced in the same way, the latter
are apprehended by our five senses and the former by a sixth, moral,
sense. Any of the senses may deceive us and lead us into making mis
taken judgements, whether of fact or value. Both kinds of judgements
are nevertheless, objectively true or false. 45
Oppenheim dismisses this position with one short line. "To repeat, the parallel
between statements of fact and value judgments does not hold."46
Calvin argues that value judgements are revealed to man through the
Bible as the word of God. It is a religious basis for the truth. The theory brings
up many questions; including whether things are just because God commands
them or does God command them because they are just. Of this religion based
theory Oppenheim says; "Religious faith, feeling, and insight are a profoundly
subjective experience and therefore cannot provide an objective ground for moral
principles of politics."47
Kant forwards the theory of the categorical imperative. It is a theory that
has as one of its foundations the principle of universalizability, and an impera
tive must meet this requirement to be valid.
The categorical imperative is, according to Kant, rationally demonstrable
and, for this reason, morally binding on all rational beings....Compat
ibility with the one categorical imperative is therefore a sufficient condi
tion for any principle of action to be a true moral one.48
Oppenheim finds two main problems with Kant's theory. First, that it
does not rule out much as immoral behavior. Second, "Furthermore, to make
no exceptions to a principle does not exclude the adoption of principles of ex
ception."49 Finally of the theory Oppenheim states;
So, if the categorical imperative is logically true and rationally demon
strable, it is so at the price of utter vacuity. It is a formal, not an ethical
principle, and no substantive moral norms, such as the golden rule, can
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be shown to be either compatible or incompatible with the principle of
universalizability. so
H.L.A. Hart presents a theory which is centered around outcomes and
goals. The primary goal being to live peacefully with one another. Hart pro
poses that living in a society will successfully ensure this goal. Oppenheim
criticizes this theory on the grounds that it is to general. He states;
Like the classical social contract theorists, Hart compares social and po
litical organizations to voluntary associations, formed to carry out the
purposes of all associates, in this case the survival of each. Now, a viable
society is a necessary but by no means sufficient condition for insuring
the survival of all.51
This is evident from the fact that even in the best of societies, a crime like mur
der can still occur for the simple fact that agents of the state cannot be every
where at once to enforce the rules of the society.
Oppenheim also makes some observations of Morganthau's theory of
how states decide on foreign policy. He characterizes Morganthau as giving the
statesman two choices for policies. They are acting in the interest of the state
and acting morally. Given the realist position of Morganthau, the state might
be at risk if the statesman opts for a moral policy. Yet, this does not strictly go
against the other choice. Thus, Oppenheim's main criticism of Morganthau's
theory is that the choices are too vague.
Oppenheim also takes issue with utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill. Under utilitarianism it is argued that the policy to be
pursued is the greatest good for the greatest number. It is clear however, that at
some times the interest of the individual will not be the same as the will of the
society. This is the crucial problem facing utilitarianism. Oppenheim also say s;
"The ideal observer theory purports to define the morally right in contradis-

69
tinction to the morally wrong, not the moral in contrast to the nonmoral."52
Lastly, Hobbes was a believer in natural law theory. Earlier on in the
book, Oppenheim presented the problems with this position. The fact that it
seems to be limited and overall, very subjective. Oppenheim believes Hobbes'
conception of natural law to be much closer to rational choice theory than true
natural law theory. Thus, Hobbes' theory is not a moral theory.
After all of these positions and others have been evaluated by Oppenheim,
he offers his opinion as to which side of the cognitivist/ non-cognitivist debate
is right. He believes that he has shown that none of the theories he has dis
cussed have proven the cognitivist point, and he declared himself for the non
cognitivist point of view. He feels that the non-cognitivist is the only position
that is compatible with any ty pe of morality.
Much like Hobbes, Niebuhr, and Morganthau, Oppenheim is wary of
the effects that ideology can have on the international and domestic order. If a
society is so entranced by an ideology, there is no telling what that belief might
compel that state to do. This century has seen the results of such an intense
identification with an ideology in Nazi Germany. While the end result was the
destruction of Hitler's regime, the destruction and death caused by the reli
gious-like fervor that the Nazis incited was the greatest that our century has
known. While there were many factors that allowed Hitler to come to power it
is clear that it was his ideology and ability to sell that ideology to the mass of
the population of Germany and Austria that was the cause of the conflict. It is
precisely this type of situation that Oppenheim hopes to avoid repeating by
limiting the effectiveness and scale of morality in domestic and international
affairs.
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In The Place of Morality in Foreign Policy, Oppenheim addresses the
issue of morality and the actions that states take directly. Oppenheim asks first
if it is at all relevant to make moral judgements in this area. It seems logical to
say that if individuals are held to some kind of moral standard in their dealings
with other individuals, then surely states can be held to some kind of moral
standard. Yet, Oppenheim is not sure if he is willing to call the considerations
that heads of state make moral or immoral. He becomes concerned with the
question of acting rationally. This is because, "Acting rationally (in a sense to
be clarified) is the first defining characteristic of the concept of interest, includ
ing such related concepts as self-interest and national interest."53 Oppenheim
defines a rational course of action as one that is the optimal means to achieve
the goal; i.e., means rationality.
One other distinction that Oppenheim makes is one between the nation
and the state. The two concepts are most often found linked to one another, but
here Oppenheim separates them. The nation tends to refer to ethnic and soci
etal conditions in a territory. This is the door by which nationalism often enters
questions of this type and creates much confusion. Oppenheim is solidly shut
ting this door. For the purpose of this work he is referring solely to the state.
The state is the actor and sovereign entity. The other reason that he uses this
conception is, "The proposed, valuationally neutral definition enables us to
determine the national interest objectively- at least in principle."54 Oppenheim
also feels that acting rationally does not necessarily mean acting interestedly.
Given these definitions of important terms, let us now turn to the issue
of the place of morality in international relations. As a general statement about
moral principles, Oppenheim says;
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An ethical statement in the area of international politics may proclaim
the general moral principle that it is permissible (or obligatory) for states
to pursue their national interest, or that it is wrong to do so if such action
violates the duty to respect the norms of international law.55
Thus, the state is bound by the concerns of international law in pursuing what
is in its interest. This seems to be infringing on the sovereignty of the state.
Indeed, this is what many states claim if they are accused of violating interna
tional law.
Oppenheim then says that there are two types of situations that states
may find themselves in that make questions of the morality of their actions
mute. These two situations are the practically unavoidable and the practically
impossible. he defines the unavoidable as follows. "Accordingly, the expres
sion, 'It is practically necessary of an agent to adopt a certain goal' will be de
fined as 'Anyone in the agent's position would normally find it too risky or
difficult or costly to do otherwise."'56 No other options exist that will bring
about the successful achievement of a goal that are better than the way in which
the policy is designed to achieve it. Practically impossible situations are just
that. The policy to be pursued is not possible to achieve, so there is absolutely
no point in trying to achieve it. Further, Oppenheim states, "'The inevitable
and the impossible must be taken as given. What lies in between constitutes the
appropriate scope for choice' - and for ethics."57
Therefore, Oppenheim has defined the place of morality in foreign policy
as the middle ground between those things that are inevitable and those things
that are impossible. Oppenheim says, "Only when the agent has a practical
choice is it relevant to advise him what he ought to do on moral grounds."58
As one can see, the situations that would allow for one to ask moral questions
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or give moral advice are few.
Finally, the fact that Oppenheim is using rationality as the basis for the
decision of when moral judgements are appropriate has interesting ramifica
tions on foreign policy. First, he states; "To urge governments to pursue the
national interest on moral grounds is to engage in a redundancy. To advise
statesmen to pursue a goal incompatible with the national interest is to dis
suade them from acting rationally."59 This results from the national interest,
by Oppenheim's definition, being inherently rational. Second, "Its rationality
is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for endorsing it, and there
is no need to appeal to morality in addition."60 If the policy is rational, then, in
Oppenheim's opinion, to counsel on the morality of the policy is pointless.
Rational equals right.
Given the positions of Morganthau and Oppenheim, what is the outlook
for moral power politics? It seems that even with the two men that the position
is most identified with, see it as limited. Morganthau's reliance on realism as
the framework with which to work gives morality little concrete ground on
which it can operate. The balancing act that he wishes to perform, packs moral
ity back into a comer only to be used in small doses and only when it appears
that appeals to morality will work. The combination of non-cognitivism and
means rationality renders morality almost alway s subjective for Oppenheim.
Also, he limits the proper scope of moral guidance only to those situations in
which there is choice available. For both men, the pursuit of power must take
precedence over that of morality.
Both seek to apply the principle of universalizabilty to moral questions
and make it a qualification for making morally based decisions. It seems that
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relying on universalizability as the yardstick in determining the scope of moral
ity is inherently limiting. Yes, morals should be universalized as much as pos
sible, but the situations that individuals and states often find themselves in are
not always universal. They are specific to the individual or the state. Also,
depending on the circumstance, the decision, be it morally guided or not, may
be a one time decision that may never occur again and whatever the course of
action taken, will not have future ramifications. If this were the case, can pursu
ing a moral action be said to violate Morganthau's realism or Oppenheim's ra
tionality?
Morganthau also cautions the reader not to look at the intentions of the
actor when judging the morality of an act. Stoessinger also points out the dif
ference between the actions of individuals and states. That individuals can be
judged on a basis of intention, while states are judged solely on a basis of out
comes. The distinction is crucial in viewing the way foreign policy is conducted.
Even in interpersonal relations, intentions are very hard to judge, and it is not
often that one can clearly tell what anothers intentions for an act were. It is this
difficulty that creates the necessity for the outcome based moral judgements of
international relations. This could be a result of the idea that the conditions that
exist between states are akin to the Hobbesian State of Nature.
Having discussed the differences between moral power politics and or
dinary power politics, let us return now to the question of whether traditional
machtpolitik is still being practiced in the latter half of the twentieth century.
Briefly restated, the machtpolitik position that is being spoken of in this thesis is
the machtpolitik doctrine as originated by Thrasymachus in the first book of
Plato's The Republic. The doctrine as one finds it there is simply that 'might
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makes right'. Examples of this being the case can be found even in the writings
of Thucydides. The idealists, having been discussed above, would find this
doctrine abhorrent to their beliefs of human nature and how societies should be
constructed. The realists of our time, while acknowledging the primacy of power,
would quibble over what the aspects of power are; and in many cases fail to
assess all of the things that affect power. Machiavelli failed to see the destruc
tive consequences of nationalism and religion, and many in this century have
failed to take these to factors into account.
It is clear that those who might still practice this doctrine will be found
among the practitioners of ordinary power politics. The two figures that fit this
mold best are Kissinger and Brzezinski. Both men served in important posi
tions in the government of the United States in the last thirty years, so both
men are familiar with the way in which affairs of state are handled at this time.
It seems fair to say that Kissenger, while being a traditional diplomat, does not
quite fit the mold of the practitioner of machtpolitik that Schmitt envisioned
earlier in this century.
Brzezinski however, fits this mold precisely in his early writings and ca
reer. He has also changed his position in his more recent writings. Especially in
Out of Control, Brzezinski breaks away from traditional machtpolitik doctrine.
He seeks to address the increasing roles that ideology and nationalism have
played as the century has progressed. Men, guns, money, and the like are no
longer the only things that determine the power that a state has. Ideology, na
tionalism, and the willingness of those serving a cause to die for it are just as
important as the traditional means of determining power.
The machtpolitik doctrine appears to have been altered beyond recogni-
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tion from what it began as. Those who one can look to as examples of the posi
tion have changed their views as the times and international environment have
changed. This is not to say that machtpolitik has been totally removed from the
stage of international relations, however, it is clearly not the strong driving force
that it was in the times of Bismarck and in the mind of Schmitt. The doctrine
has been used less and less in this century because it is not able to deal with the
changed situation as well as it once was able to deal with the affairs of states.
Those who practiced the doctrine have recognized this fact and have adapted
to the times and this adaptation has involved relying less on the traditional
machtpolitik position.
As we have seen with Morganthau and Oppenheim, issues of morality
are not as easily dealt with as they may first appear when applied to interna
tional relations. Leaders of states are left to make moral decisions on the grounds
of outcomes and thus all international morality is reactionary when it is prac
ticed at all. Oppenheim and Morganthau both seek to limit the claim of moral
action in the international scene. With the sway held over most populations by
ideology, religion, and rabid nationalism; if one state were able to claim moral
self-righteousness, the consequences could be quite dire. States moved by these
considerations would be truly disruptive forces on the international level. Mo
rality would be perverted from the stabilizing force of the international order to
a greatly destructive drive even more so than any other factor.
In conclusion, the machtpolitik doctrine no longer exists in the form pre
sented by Thrasymachus. The doctrine has become more and more diffused
over the course of the century, and its last true proponent was Carl Schmitt.
While it is apparent that something is needed to provide a stabilizing force on
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the international scene, morality is not likely to be the answer. As Morganthau
and Oppenheim point out, morality is potentially more destructive than ideol
ogy, religion, and nationalism. The remaining questions of the thesis will be
addressed below.
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CHAPTER VI
MACHTPOLITK AND NIETZSCHE
This paper has sought to address three main issues. Does the machtpolitik
position as exemplified by Thrasymachus and later by Schmitt still exist in the
twilight of the century? Can diplomacy be conducted meaningfully by demo
cratic states or has democracy crippled diplomacy as a means of preventing
international hostilities? Finally, what are the causes of instability in the inter
national order? These are questions with many different answers to them de
pending on what position the person being asked believes in. The main divi
sions I have discussed above have been the machtpolitikers like Thrasymachus
and Schmitt, the idealists, the normative realists and the descriptive realists. It
is the division between the idealists and the two realist positions that have had
the most effect on how we perceive things in this century.
The question of whether machtpolitik still exists in our time is not as
clear cut as one would hope it to be. The machtpolitik doctrine that I have
discussed above is that of Thrasymachus in Plato's The Republic, who stated it
bluntly as might makes right. In our time, Carl Schmitt is the only philosopher
who can truly be said to have followed this doctrine. Schmitt sought to return
to Hobbes' State of Nature as a paradigm for international relations and in a
State of Nature conception, might does truly make right. The changes in the
world over the second half of this century have greatly affected how we must
look at this type of position. The conception of power that exists today is radi
cally different than it was fifty to a hundred years ago.
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The machtpolitik that Schmitt embraces and Bismarck practiced is no
longer in existence. The position has continued, but it has become much more
diffuse in this century . Kissinger and Brzezinski were perhaps the two figures
that could be most closely associated with the machtpolitik tradition, but even
they have softened their positions recently. Brzezinski especially has changed
his position. He recognizes that ideology and the metamyths that he discusses
have altered both how power is perceived and what constitutes power. More
shall be said on this in addressing our third topic. So, what remains of the
machtpolitik position that I have been discussing is very little, and almost does
not resemble the doctrine as it was originally put forth. Brute force is still recog
nized as power in our time, but it is the other intangible things, like ideologies,
that have altered power and transformed the machtpolitik position.
Chapter IV addressed the issue of diplomacy versus democracy in the
form of the question of which type of government is preferable, the sovereign
or a democracy? The main arguments for democracy are that it better repre
sents the will of the people; that it provides a stable transition of power; that it
better preserves the rights of the individual citizens; and that democratic states
are less likely to pursue foreign policy goals through the use of force. All of
these things are or are thought to be advantages of democracy. However, al
most to a man, all of the philosophers that I have discussed above lament the
loss of traditional diplomacy.
Under the old system of sovereigns, diplomacy was conducted by a cer
tain set of protocols that all of those participating knew and followed. The
Sovereigns appointed men of distinction to be their diplomats and had the ut
most confidence in them to do their jobs and pursue and protect the interests of
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the state. Ultimately, the final decisions were up to the sovereign, but with
having such high confidence in his diplomats, a sovereign could probably just
signed off on the negotiations. This is not the case in a democracy. Once the
diplomats have negotiated a treaty, it must be reviewed and approved by a
body that speaks for the people. In the case of the United States, it is the Senate
that must approve treaties.
It is the above mentioned protocols of diplomacy that allowed diplo
mats of differing cultures to meet and discuss issues of great importance with
the hope of finding a solution. Also, it was the protocols that provided a com
mon ground and allowed for sides to influence one another. It is the loss of
these protocols that is lamented by Kissinger, Brzezinski and others. Kissinger
states;" A similar outlook about aims and methods eases the tasks of diplomacy
- it may even be a precondition for it. In the absence of such a consensus, diplo
mats can still meet, but they lose the ability to persuade."1 It is the ability to
persuade that is crucial to diplomacy, and if it is lacking then nothing can be
accomplished. Democracy and the rise of nationalism and ideology have served
to make this much more difficult.
So, while democracy does many things for the individual citizen and
provides internal stability, it is unable to deal with some aspects of international
relations as well as a sovereign and the traditional methods of diplomacy. A
sovereign can react in a crisis situation with much more speed and certainty
than a democracy. Given the changes in the way states can affect one another,
speed in decision making is becoming more and more crucial. Also, a system
for negotiations that is not influenced by ideology is more likely to reach a solu
tion than one in which ideology is rampant and creating intractable parties.
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Like the issue of machtpolitik, there is no clear cut answer; both sides have their
advantages and disadvantages. It is up to the individual to decide for them
selves which form they think is better.
The ultimate goal of all international relations is to keep the international
environment stable and keep conflict to a minimum if there has to be any at all.
One can see however, that this goal is far from being met in our time. What is
the source of this continuing problem? Is it the state system as it currently exists?
Is it the influence of ideologies on the populations? Or is it human nature itself?
If we look at the State of Nature as Hobbes presented it once again, we
shall see that the state system is merely a reflection of what individuals will do
to one another if given the opportunity to do so. In Hobbes' opinion it is the
state that prevents the worst of the tendencies of man from being constantly
acted upon. Hobbes would feel that it is the lack of an authority to overawe the
states that explains the conflict between states. This then, is a problem without
an answer, because any of the attempts to create such an authority in this cen
tury have met with bitter disappointment, and all other methods that have been
tried to prevent conflict have also failed.
Can we then place the blame for all of this at the foot of the ideologies,
religious fervor, and rampant nationalism of this century? While they can ex
plain a great deal of the reluctance to engage in a supra-national government,
they do not, initially, have a life of their own. As the ideology gains adherents it
will take on a life of its own, for good or ill. The Cold War once again provides
a fine example of this type of behavior. However, something more must lie
underneath the surface of the ideological beliefs. There must be something that
explains why people can fall into these beliefs and be swept away by them.
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This leaves us with human nature as the source of all the conflict and
strife. One will accept this or not based on how one views human nature. If one
believes along the lines of Hobbes, then this position will make perfect sense.
Machiavelli and Hobbes saw that man is looking for guidance of some sort.
This longing for direction can be exploited by those of a mind to do so. Hitler
clearly did this in Germany and the result was World War II. This longing for
direction or something to believe in gives ideology the door it needs to enter the
human psyche and convert it to the purpose of the ideology.
What then is a solution to this problem of human nature inclining us to
incessant conflict? The remainder of this conclusion will briefly describe the
philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche and apply it as a solution to this problem.
Nietzsche's grand project was the reevaluation of all values, by which he sought
to improve the human condition. It is in this sense that one should consider
Nietzsche when looking at issues of human nature and any attempts to modify
or change it. Ultimately, it seems that a radical change in human nature is what
is needed to change the face of international relations and bring conflict to an
end. I shall present Nietzsche as an idealist in the sense that his solution cannot
truly be hoped to come to pass. The scale of the project is too large and ulti
mately too radical, however desirable it may be.
The three works of Nietzsche that will be used in addressing the subject
are Beyond Good & Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, and Thus Spake
Zarathustra. These books present the majority of Nietzsche's thought on power
and morality. The first step in evaluating Nietzsche's thought and using it to tie
together the loose strings of the power politic tradition, is to look at how
Nietzsche defined power. The definition that the tradition has used for most of
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its' history is power as the ability to influence the actions of another.
Machtpolitik, as I have defined it, is solely concerned with what power can
compel others to do on your behalf. These definitions are directed externally
and seek to exert control over the actions and drives of another person or state.
Nietzsche did not believe in this type of power. Walter Kaufmann in his book
Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist. Antichrist says the following of Nietzsche's
view of this type of power. "Power here must evidently mean 'worldly power'
and social success, making friends, and influencing people. Because men wish
to have such power, they betray their destiny, fail to cultivate their physis, and
conform."2 It is the last effect of worldly power that Nietzsche fights most
against, the call to conformity. It is conformity and its effects that Nietzsche rails
against. Conformity must be overcome by the exercise of the will to power and is
crucial to the understanding of the distinction between master and slave morality.
Nietzsche does by no means seek to eliminate power as a consideration
in the affairs of man. What he is striving to do is to redefine power into some
thing more and better. Kaufmann states;
Power is still the standard of value - but this joy is the conscious feeling
that is inextricably connected with a man's possession of power. Con
versely, the man who experiences this joy is the powerful man - and in
stead of relying on heavenly powers to redeem him, to give meaning to
his life, and to justify the world, he gives meaning to his own life by
achieving perfection and exulting in every moment.3
Thus, for Nietzsche, power is turned from something other directed to a self
directed drive. The truly powerful man does not have to bend others to his
will. His will is sufficient for himself, and mush like Machiavelli hoped, the one
man will provide an example that other men may see and seek to emulate.
The main ideas of Nietzsche that are of interest in looking at power poli-
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tics and human nature are the will to power and the distinction between master
and slave morality. The will to power is crucial in that it is the foundation that
Nietzsche builds much of his philosophy on. Nietzsche viewed the will to power
as a drive in every living thing. The drive of the will to power makes all things
strive to better themselves. In man, this is represented by the man who comes
to control his passions. The man, who while he is able to feel passion, is not
governed by passion. The self is something to be overcome. This struggle to
overcome is at the core of Nietzsche's belief. It is the will to power that is ulti
mately responsible for all of the actions that we perform.
Master and slave morality is the distinction that Nietzsche made for dif
ferent types of morality. While many believe that Nietzsche was radically anti
moral, nothing could be further from the truth. What is true is that he saw most
of the morality of his time as being other directed and not in line with what he
saw as the true nature of Christianity. Nietzsche said of traditional morality;
"We believe that morality in the traditional sense, the morality of intentions,
was a prejudice, precipitate and perhaps provisional - something on the order
of astrology an alchemy - but in any case something that must be overcome."4
It is traditional morality that is slave morality. It is a morality based on belief in
something transcendental, like God. Nietzsche also calls this type of morality
herd morality. Another criticism that Nietzsche levels at slave morality can be
seen in the following passage.
All these moralities that address themselves to the individual, for the
sake of his 'happiness', as one says - what are they but counsels for be
havior in relation to the degree of dangerousness in which the individual
lives with himself, recipes against his passions, his good and bad incli
nations insofar as they have the will to power and want to play the mas
ter; little and great prudences and artifices that exude the nook odor of
old nostrums and of the wisdom of old women; all of them baroque and
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unreasonable in form - because they address themselves to 'all', because
they generalize where one must not generalize.5
From the quote above, it is obvious that Nietzsche would disagree vehe
mently with Morganthau and Oppenheim's insistence of making
univeralizability part of a definition of morality. As Nietzsche states, there are
instances where slave morality seeks to generalize, that cannot and should not
be generalized. This is merely one aspect of the problem that Nietzsche has
with slave morality. The other aspect of the problem is very similar to the prob
lem that Nietzsche had with the state. He sees the state as stamping out indi
viduality and that is also what he believes slave morality will do. It is a call to
conformity and not to uniqueness. To Nietzsche, every living thing becomes
unique as it exercises its will to power.
Master morality is achieved when one is no longer bound by the limita
tions of slave morality. The master moralist, the noble man in the following
quotation, now depends upon himself to establish morals. "The noble type of
man experiences itself as determining values; it does not need approval; it judges,
'what is harmful to me is harmful in itself'; it knows itself to be that which first
accords honor to things; it is value-creating."6 The master moralist has exer
cised his will to power to achieve this heightened state in which he himself
becomes the arbiter of what is good and what is evil.
Like Hobbes, much of Nietzsche's theory is about the felicity of the indi
vidual. In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche presents us with the idea of the_
ubermensch, the overman. Zarathustra is one of the overmen. He has over
come many obstacles due to the drive of his will to power and has become the
passionate man who controls his passion and lives in the moment. It has been
a struggle for Zarathustra to achieve this level of consciousness and he has lived
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as a hermit for long periods of time in order that he may transcend the morality
and the mind-set of the herd. The felicity for Zarathustra and those like him is
complete in every way because they have transcended the boundaries of what
society would have them conform to, both in becoming master moralists and in
no longer desiring the material things that society says one needs to be success
ful or happy.
Nietzsche envisioned a society of ubermenschen that would be much
like most of the other idealists visions of utopia. In a society of ubermenschen,
all would have what they needed, without having to subjugate or deprive oth
ers, because of their heightened consciousness. Nietzsche sought to begin the
process of establishing this type of society, but like his goal of the revaluation of
all values, it never came to be.
Daniel W. Conway in his book Nietzsche & the Political eloquently pre
sents an interpretation of the ubermensch in the context of a political society.
As I have stated above, the ubermensch is the result of an individual exerting
their will to power to become something more and better. Conway states;
"Nietzsche's attempt to retrieve the founding question of politics reflects his
conviction that it is the business of politics to legislate the conditions of the
permanent enhancement of humankind (BGE 257)."7 The felicity that the po
litical order enables should be of such a degree that people are able to become
what they are meant to be, ubermenschen .
Many have come to see Nietzsche as the embodiment of the nihilist posi
tion. This is not the case. Nietzsche laments that modern society seems to be on
a course that will lead to nothing but nihilism, but he is trying to stop the de
scent. Conway states;
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The Ubermensch thus constitutes Nietzsche's general answer to the
founding question of politics: 'we' should undertake to breed a type of
individual whose pursuit of self-perfection contributes to the enhance
ment of humankind and thereby justifies our own existence. 'We' should
undertake the establishment of a political regime that will in turn envi
sion the Ubermensch as its unimaginable, singular product. 8
Thus, Nietzsche transfers the burden of improvement from the one, Zarathustra,
to the many of the society.
However, Nietzsche comes to the conclusion that society itself has be
come part of the problem. He even admits his own failings in finding a solu
tion. Conway states;
He consequently concludes that presently there exists no macropolitical
solution to the problem of decadence in late modernity. The 'philoso
phers of the future' may someday arrive at one, but Nietzsche himself,
rooted inextricably in the decadence he so despises, cannot.9
W hat then is Nietzsche's course of action to be?
Conway feels that Nietzsche reduces the scope of his project by distinguishing between what Conway calls the political macrosphere and microsphere.
I distinguish between the macropolitical (or institutional) and the
micropolitical (or infra-institutional) incarnations of his perfectionism.
The political macrosphere comprises the network of relations that obtain
between a people's institutions and its representative exemplars, while
the political microsphere comprises those relations between a people and
its representative exemplars that are not mediated by social institutions.10
It is in the microsphere that Nietzsche will operate to oppose the will to noth
ingness.
It is his specific task to convoke a gathering of those individuals who are
best suited to survive the twilight of the idols, and to train these unlikely
'heroes' in the experimental disciplines that are most likely to stave off
the will to nothingness. 11
It is in the political microsphere that Nietzsche will strive to develop as

89
many ubermenschen as possible. This is where he will make his stand against
nihilism and attempt to cultivate the evolution of humankind. The project that
faces him is almost unapproachably large and daunting, y et Nietzsche does not
shirk from what he feels is his duty. If he can help guide those who will become
"philosophers of the future", then all of his efforts will have served a purpose.
Even if he did not live to see it.
In conclusion, Nietzsche faced the decadence of modernity and the re
sulting nihilistic attitudes with a courage and a hope that many would not have
attributed to him. While his goal of creating a society of ubermenschen has
never come to pass and the problems that Nietzsche saw in his time have only
seemed to become larger in ours, the idealist in all of us cannot but hope for the
betterment of the future. Nietzsche had that hope amidst all of the adversity
that faced him. We can give no greater tribute to Nietzsche, humankind, and
ourselves than to emulate his hope.
1 Kissinger, p. 55
2 Kaufmann, p. 180
3 Kaufmann, p. 324
4 Nietzsche, BGE, p. 44-45
5 Nietzsche, BGE, p. 109
6 Nietzsche, BGE, p. 205
7 Conway, p. 6
8 Conway, p. 26
9 Conway, p. 46
10 Conway, p. 48
11 Conway, p. 47
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